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오늘이 있기까지 힘이 되어준 사랑하는 엄마 아빠 동생 우진이에게 감사합니다
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The United States health care system faces difficult challenges regarding access, cost,
and quality of health care. This dissertation consists of three essays addressing dif-
ferent topics in health economics aimed to meet some of these challenges.
The first essay investigates the impact of the great recession on hospital capital
investment and how hospitals respond to offset the recession effect. Hospital capital
investment is important for acquiring and maintaining technology and equipment
needed to provide health care. Hospital cutbacks in capital investment may have
negative implications for patient outcomes. Most hospitals rely on debt and internal
cash flow to fund capital investment. The great recession may have made it difficult
for hospitals to borrow thus reducing capital investments. Using the Euler equation
with a liquidity constraint to model hospital capital investment is a novel contribution
to the literature. I estimate the model with California hospital data and system
generalized method of moments. Estimates were decomposed to show the recession
effect in terms of investment dollars. Comparing the changes in hospital capital
investment between 2006 and 2009 showed that hospitals used cash flow to increase
capital investment by $2.5 million other things equal.
The second essay investigates the incremental cost effectiveness of a telecare man-
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agement intervention for managing pain and depression among patients with cancer.
Pain and depression are often undetected and undertreated among patients with can-
cer. Telecare management has been shown to be effective for managing pain and
depression among patients with cancer. Outcomes and cost data from the Indiana
Cancer Pain and Depression trial was analyzed to the determine the cost effectiveness
of the telecare management intervention. The intervention group was associated with
more depression-free days and better quality-adjusted life years than the usual care
group.
The third essay investigates how out-of-pocket health care spending trends changed
before and during the recession. The great recession slowed the growth of health care
spending and its impact may have been different for adults and children. Reduction in
children’s health care spending for may hinder children’s access to routine care which
could have adverse implications in the long run. Children with special health care
needs are particularly vulnerable to adverse outcomes from inadequate care. Out-of-
pocket spending trends of privately insured families with children was examined using
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data from 2001 to 2009. Out-of-pocket spend-
ing for most children was not affected by the recession. But out-of-pocket spending
for children with special needs decreased during the recession. Also out-of-pocket
spending decreased for adult family members during the recession.
My dissertation contributes to the health economics literature by conducting em-
pirical analysis of the challenges faced by the health care system to guide policy
making. Furthermore, my dissertation is interdisciplinary, drawing from the disci-
plines of economics, finance, health services research, and policy. The results from
my dissertation is novel and relevant to each discipline.
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Chapter 2
The Great Recession and Hospital
Capital Investment
2.1 Introduction
Capital investments include purchases for plant, property, and equipment needed
for hospital operations. Hospital capital investment is important for acquiring and
maintaining technology and equipment necessary to address patient needs, such as
beds, magnetic resonance imaging, and rooms. Cutbacks in capital investment for
hospital operations may have negative implications for patient outcomes.
The great recession in the United States began in December 2007 and ended
in June 2009 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). The financial crisis
made it very difficult for hospitals to borrow money (American Hospital Associa-
tion, 2010). Not-for-profit hospitals, which comprise about 58% of US community
hospitals (American Hospital Association, 2013), rely on debt in the form of bonds
and bank loans as the main source of capital to fund capital investments. Investor
owned hospitals (21% of US community hospitals) have more flexibility in financing
capital investments. In addition to debt they can raise equity by selling stocks. In
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2008, nearly half of all non-federal hospitals had put capital projects, including fa-
cilities, clinical technology, and information technology, on hold or stopped projects
in progress (American Hospital Association, 2009). Also the great recession deterio-
rated the value of marketable securities held by hospitals. Hospital endowment loss
due to recession led to delayed purchase of health IT and cuts to unprofitable services
(Dranove et al., 2013).
Policy changes in response to the recession aimed to increase government fund-
ing to hospitals. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),
which temporarily increased the federal portion of Medicaid payments, was in effect
from October 2008 to December 2010, then extended through June 2011. National
Health Expenditure Accounts showed that federal Medicaid spending increased 22.0%
and state spending decreased 9.8% in 2009 (Martin et al., 2011). Increased federal
Medicaid payments allowed states to avoid cuts in Medicaid benefits or provider re-
imbursement rates (Cassidy, 2010).
The ARRA also enacted the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. The HITECH Act provided $25.9 billion to promote
the adoption and meaningful use of health information technology (PL 111-5, 2009).
Despite federal efforts to improve funding to hospitals, the great recession was
detrimental to hospital capital investment. National estimates based on the Truven
database showed an increasing trend for mean construction-in-progress between 2005
and 2007, then a flat trend between 2007 and 2009 at about $15 million (Koepke,
2012). Cuts to capital investment were reflected in aging facilities. The average age
of plants was about 9.5 years between 2005 and 2008, then it increased to 10.5 years
between 2009 and 2011 (Koepke, 2012).
California hospital financial data suggests that the great recession was detrimental
to hospital capital investment. California’s state GDP declined from 2007 to 2009
(fig. 2.1). Hospital capital investment normalized by capital decreased from 2008
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to 2010, reversing the increasing trend from 2003 to 2008 (fig. 2.2). Hospital capital
investment remained relatively flat from 2008 to 2010 (fig. 2.3). Hospital capital stock
decreased from 2007 to 2008 then increased from 2008 to 2010 (fig. 2.4). The number
of hospitals commencing building projects that cost $1 million or more declined from
2007 to 2009 (fig. 2.5). Similarly, the number of hospitals purchasing equipment that
cost $500 thousand or more declined from 2007 to 2009 (fig. 2.6).
Figure 2.1: California GDP All Industry
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure 2.2: Mean Capital Investment per Dollar of Capital with 95% C.I.
Figure 2.3: Mean Capital Investment with 95% C.I.
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Figure 2.4: Mean Capital Stock with 95% C.I.
Figure 2.5: Commenced any building projects +$1 million?
Source: OSHPD 28th Year (2002-2003) to 38th Year (2012-2013)
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Figure 2.6: Purchased any equipment that cost +$500 thousand?
Source: OSHPD 28th Year (2002-2003) to 38th Year (2012-2013)
The theoretical mechanism through which the recession affected hospital capital
investment has not been investigated in the health economics literature. The seminal
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem showed that in a perfect capital market, the
value of the firm is independent of its capital structure. Capital structure is how
much of the firm’s capital is composed of debt verses equity. In such a case, the value
of the firm only depends on the present value of the expected profits from its assets.
Therefore, the firm is indifferent between using debt or equity to finance investment.
Furthermore, in a perfect capital market the cost of debt and the opportunity cost
of internal cash are equal; this makes them perfect substitutes and makes the firm’s
decision to invest independent of its ability to generate cash flow (Jorgenson, 1963;
Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Jorgenson and Siebert, 1968). A perfectly functioning
capital market would allow a firm with low current cash flow, such as a startup
company, to invest by raising equity and debt capital if the firm is expected to generate
high future profits.
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Departing from the perfect capital market model, literature on capital market
imperfections has explored how information problems in the capital market constrain
firms’ ability to borrow and subsequently affect their investment decisions (Fazzari
and Athey, 1987; Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Whited, 1992). Investment
models with liquidity constraint hypothesize that when lenders have less information
than the firm regarding the firm’s financial performance, the firm’s cost of borrowing
may be drastically higher than the opportunity cost of internal cost. The high cost of
borrowing puts a liquidity constraint on the firm. If the firm is liquidity constrained,
then investment should be related to the firm’s cash flow because the firm must rely
more on internal cash to fund investments. These studies have empirically tested the
hypothesis on manufacturing firms and their results have been supportive.
The recession may have contributed to the information asymmetry between hos-
pitals and lenders because lenders expected demand for hospital services to fall like
the rest of the economy, whereas demand for hospital services may actually have
been less affected. The Medicare population is not be affected by the weakened la-
bor market and the loss of private insurance might have been partially offset by the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansion.
Information problem during the recession may have discouraged capital invest-
ments because lenders limited how much hospitals could borrow, placing a liquidity
constraint on hospitals. When unable to borrow debt due to liquidity constraint,
hospitals may respond by using their own cash flow to fund investments. This paper
aims to address the gap in the literature by modeling hospital capital investment
decision under liquidity constraint.
Understanding the impact of the recession on hospital capital investment will
help administrators financially prepare to smooth out their investment. If the effect
of the recession on capital investment is driven by liquidity constraint, policy changes
that mitigate the information asymmetry problem between hospitals and lenders may
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improve hospital access to debt for capital investments when the next economic crisis
hits.
First, I estimated the impact of the great recession on hospital capital investment.
Second, I estimated how much cash flow hospitals used to offset the impact of the great
recession on hospital capital investment. Lessons from the recession will be valuable
because hospitals continue to face financial challenges today. Major credit rating
agencies have a negative outlook for the hospital industry in 2015 citing declining
operating cash flows and uncertainties over the ACA (Reuters, 2014).
Furthermore, the severity of liquidity constraint might vary by the type of hospital
ownership. Ownership differences allow for different financing mechanisms. Not for
profit and public hospitals do not have access to equity capital while investor owned
hospital do, hence investor owned hospitals are less likely to be liquidity constrained.
Ownership differences in financial disclosure regulations may contribute to liquid-
ity constraint as well. Not for profit hospitals and public hospitals are more likely to
be liquidity constrained than investor owned hospital because the municipal bonds
they issue are subject to fewer regulations than bonds issued by investor owned hospi-
tals (Government Accountability Office, 2012). Municipal bonds are exempt from the
registration and periodic reporting provisions of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). Also, SEC and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB)
are not authorized to require bond issuers to file certain financial information. The
Government Accountability Office has documented lenders’ criticisms regarding the
timeliness, frequency, and completeness of municipal bond disclosures (Government
Accountability Office, 2012). The most notable criticism was that municipal bond
issuers are not required to provide quarterly financial statements.
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2.2 Previous Literature
Empirical test of firm liquidity constraint splits the study sample by predictor of
liquidity constraint and separately estimating the effect of liquidity variable (cash
flow) on investment controlling for the theoretical determinant of investment (Tobin’s
Q or marginal product of capital) (Hubbard, 1997).
Poor hospital cash flow led to cutbacks in hospital investments in plant and equip-
ment among community hospitals between 1995 and 2000 (Bazzoli et al., 2007). How-
ever it is unclear whether liquidity constraint was driving the relationship. Medicare
payment cuts resulting from the Balance Budget Act of 1997 and the growth of Health
Maintenance Organizations during that time period may have increased the risk of
lending to hospitals but the study does not address liquidity constraint directly.
Liquidity was strongly related to investment among small non-system hospitals
(Calem and Rizzo, 1995). System hospitals are less likely to face financing constraints
because they can diversify risk by earning revenue from a wider range of services.
Having diverse revenue sources mean they are less likely to be affected by disruptions
in service lines or fluctuations in demand for services. Health information technology
systems can lower information asymmetries, but at a high fixed cost, which system
hospitals can spread out over their affiliated hospitals. Also system hospitals may
have greater negotiating power against payers and vendors to generate higher profit.
Studies of hospital liquidity constraint focused on cash flow as a measure of finan-
cial performance. However hospitals often carry large cash reserves to smooth out
fluctuations in revenues and expenses and to improve bond ratings from credit rating
agencies (Robinson, 2002). A hospital may compensate for its low borrowing limit by
using its cash reserve in addition to cash flow to internally fund capital investment
or to improve access to debt from the capital market. Holding a large reserve has
negative welfare implications for patients as those funds could have been used for
hospital operations had there been no liquidity constraint.
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The great recession was a powerful disruption to the national economy. My study
will describe hospital capital investment pre-recession, during the recession, and dur-
ing the recovery to identify liquidity constraint among hospitals during each time
period. I contribute to the literature by investigating whether hospitals used cash
flow and cash reserves to finance capital investment in response to liquidity constraint
driven by the recession. Furthermore hospital ownership differences in liquidity con-
straint will be addressed.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Theoretical Model
In a perfect capital market, the interest rate sets the equilibrium quantity of capital.
The neoclassical model of investment (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Jorgenson, 1963)
has focused on deriving the optimal level of capital for a given rental price of capital.
However, hospitals may have been liquidity constrained during the recession. Lenders
do not have full information about how the demand for hospital services may be less
sensitive to the recession than other services.
Lenders may place a liquidity constraint, by limiting the amount a hospital can
borrow, raising the cost of borrowing, or requiring cash reserves as collateral. Liq-
uidity constrained hospitals, unable to borrow debt, may fund capital investments
internally with cash. Hence capital investment decision by a liquidity constrained
hospital should be sensitive to its cash flow.
Hospital manger’s capital investment decision was modeled using a dynamic utility
maximization problem (Derivation shown in appendix). The solution to the problem
is the Euler equation. The intuition behind the Euler equation is that the hospital
maximizes its utility over an infinite time horizon by equating its marginal cost of
capital investment of today to the expected discounted marginal benefit of capital
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investment in the future. Liquidity constraint was added to the maximization problem
by adapting the specification of Whited (1992); Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999).
Value function V maximizes the manager’s utility function at time t and the
present value of all expected future utilities discounted by discount factor β (eqn. 2.1).
U is the hospital manager’s utility function to be maximized (eqn. 2.2). It is specified
as net profits where cash inflows include operating profits pi and borrowing B; cash
outflows include adjustment cost CK , capital investments IK , and interest expense
on debt rD.
V (Kt, Dt) = max
IKt ,Bt
Ut + Et
∞∑
s=1
βsUt+s (2.1)
Ut = pit(Kt, Lt, ζt)− CK(Kt, IKt )− IKt (2.2)
− rtDt +Bt
Operating profits pi (flow) is a function of capital Kt, labor Lt, and a random
profitability shock ζt. Labor Lt is assumed to be perfectly supplied from an elastic
market at each time period and does not evolve over time. The price of hospital
output and the price of capital are set by the market.
The adjustment cost of capital investment CK (flow) is typically specified as a
function of capital K and capital investment IK . It is convex in investment to rep-
resent how increasing investment incurs growing adjustment costs (Lucas, Jr., 1967;
Gould, 1968; Treadway, 1969).
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CK(Kt, I
K
t ) =
α
2
(
IKt
Kt
)2
Kt (2.3)
Hospitals may face convex adjustment cost because its capital stock mostly in-
cludes specialized medical equipments and facilities. Increasing capital stock incurs
costs because of installation and learning. Decreasing capital stock incurs costs be-
cause hospital equipment and facilities are difficult to resell or repurpose (irreversibil-
ity) hence costs are incurred when reselling or disposing. The adjustment cost is
reciprocal to capital stock because larger stock may allow for economies of scale and
reduce the adjustment cost. The empirical specification for the adjustment cost of
capital investment (eqn. 2.3) is a function of capital K , capital investment IK , and
a parameter α. Graphically, the adjustment cost (Y-axis) with respect to investment
(X-axis) is represented by a parabola where the vertex represents no change in capital
stock (zero investment). A positive adjustment cost is incurred when there is a change
in capital stock (positive or negative investment) and the adjustment cost rises at an
increasing rate with the magnitude of the investment.
Capital K (state variable, stock) represents the total stock of capital. Capital
evolves over time through the capital accumulation equation (eqn. 2.4). Capital
stock in the next time period Kt+1 is equal to capital stock Kt , minus depreciation
δKt (depreciation rate δ) , plus capital investment IKt at current period. Capital K
is restricted to be non-negative because it is a required input for hospital operations
(eqn. 2.5). Capital investment IK (control variable, flow) represents the flow that
changes the stock of capital Kt. Capital investment includes expenditures on plant,
property, and equipment. Assume constant price of IKt , normalized to unity.
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Kt+1 = g(Kt, I
K
t ) = Kt(1− δ) + IKt (2.4)
Kt ≥ 0 (2.5)
Borrowing Bt (control variable, flow) represents the flow that changes the stock of
net debt Dt (eqn. 2.6). Borrowing Bt can be positive or negative because a hospital
can choose to increase or decrease its net debt. Assume a constant price of Bt,
normalized to unity.
Dt+1 = n(Dt, Bt) = Dt +Bt (2.6)
The cost of debt or the interest rate required by debt suppliers is rt > 0. The
discount factor is β = ( 1
1+R
)s where the discount rate R is the hospital’s weighted
average corporate cost of capital.
Liquidity constraint limits net debt D to be less than or equal to D∗ (eqn. 2.7).
D∗ represents an upper bound on net debt set by creditors.
Dt ≤ D∗t (2.7)
Bankruptcy constraint specifies net profits Ut to be non-negative (eqn. 2.8). Nega-
tive net profits indicate that a hospital is bankrupt where cash inflow is not sufficient
to pay for cash outflows.
15
Ut ≥ 0 (2.8)
The solution to the maximization with respect to investment IKt and borrowing
Bt yield the following Euler equation.
IKit
Kit
= Et
[
β
α
(
constant+
1
β
−
(
rt+1 + 1 +
γit+1
1 + λit
)
+MPKit+1
)]
(2.9)
Capital investment IKit represents the net changes in capital stock Kit at the end of
the reporting period. Capital stock Kit represents the total stock of capital owned by
the hospital at the beginning of the reporting period. Neoclassical theory, assuming
perfect information, models investment as a function of marginal product of capital
MPK and interest rate r.
However, with asymmetric information in the lending market the borrowing firm
is liquidity constrained thus its investment is correlated with firm’s financial perfor-
mance. λ is the Lagrangian multiplier on non-negativity constraint (eqn. 2.8) and
γ is the Lagrangian multiplier on liquidity constraint (eqn. 2.7). γt+1
1+λit
is non-zero
when both constraints are binding, indicating that a hospital is liquidity constrained.
γt+1
1+λit
is not observed but parameterized with variables correlated with the hospital’s
financial performance (Whited 1992).(
rt+1 + 1 +
γit+1
1+λit
)
represents the interest expense the hospitals has to pay at t+ 1
for the stock of net debt Dt and borrowing Bt made at time t. Additionally, a hospital
expecting a binding liquidity constraint γt+1 would effectively face a higher interest
expense at t+ 1. A higher interest expense at t+ 1 would discourage hospitals from
borrowing at t, which would increase their risk of bankruptcy at t and decrease capital
investment made at t.
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2.3.2 Empirical Model
I specified the empirical model based on the theoretical results. The liquidity and
non-negativity constraint factor γt+1
1+λit
was specified as a function of operating cash
flow CFit and liquid assets LAit (eqn. 2.10) which are normalized by capital.
γit+1
1 + λit
= β0 + β1
CFit
Kit
+ β2
LAit
Kit
(2.10)
Operating cash flow measures the net cash inflows and outflows from hospital op-
erations at the end of the reporting period. Operating cash inflows include payments
from payors and donations, and operating cash outflows include cash expensed to pay
for labor and supplies. Liquid assets include cash reserves and marketable securities
which can be used to fund investments directly or used as collateral to lower the cost
of debt. Operating cash flow has been used in the literature to capture the impact
of financial market imperfections on investment. In the context of hospitals, not for
profit hospitals in particular, liquid assets should also be linked to investment in the
presence of liquidity constraint.
The marginal product of capital MPKit is the change in profits from a unit
change in capital stock. The marginal product of capital captures the effect of the
marginal product of capital on investment derived from the neoclassical model. Since
the marginal product of capital is unobserved, the average product of capital APKit,
specified by operating revenue per capital, was used. (Relationship between MPK
and APK shown in appendix).
The interest rate (rit+1) was measured by average interest rate on long term debt.
Capital investments are often financed through bonds and bank loans. Including the
interest rate in the model should clarify whether the effect of financial variables cash
flow and net debt on investment is via affecting the interest rate or via affecting the
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bankruptcy and liquidity constraint.
The empirical model for I
K
it
Kit
to be estimated is a function of operating cash flow,
liquid assets, interest rate, and marginal product of capital (eqn. 2.11). ωt is year
fixed effects. µi is hospital fixed effects. υit is the idiosyncratic error. Significant β
coefficients indicate that financial performance is linked to capital investment, which
is evidence of liquidity constrain.
IKit
Kit
= cons+ β1
CFit
Kit
+ β2
LAit
Kit
+ β3rt+1 + β4APKt+1
+ ωt + µi + υit (2.11)
2.3.3 Identification Strategy
System GMM
The estimation model (eqn. 2.11) contains endogenous regressors and unobserved hos-
pital effect that will bias OLS estimates. The regressors operating cash flow, liquid
assets, APK, and r are endogenous to unobserved shocks related to capital investment
and the direction of bias could be positive or negative. For example, hospitals’ service
mission to improve the health of the community will exert a negative bias on the effect
of operating cash flow. Service activity with a quality objective rather than a profit
objective will be negatively correlated with operating cash flow. At the same time,
investment will be positively correlated with service activity because equipment and
facilities will be needed to carry out the service activity. In contrast, hospitals’ repu-
tation will exert a positive bias on the effect of operating cash flow. Hospitals with a
good reputation will attract patients thus reputation will be positively correlated with
operating cash flow. Also, hospitals will invest more to maintain a good reputation
thus reputation will be positively correlated with investments. Unobserved hospital
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effects, such as the performance of the hospital’s manager, may affect operating cash
flow and investment. The system generalized method of moments (System GMM)
estimator was used to address fixed effects and endogeneity in the estimation model.
System GMM estimates the system of levels and differenced equation using the
lags and lag differences of the endogenous regressors as instruments for the endoge-
nous regressors. The estimation model (eqn. 2.11) fits in the system GMM framework
as follows. Consider a data generating process with the dependent variable yt (in-
dex i is suppressed for simplification) and endogenous regressor xt. yt is
IKt
Kt
and
xt is CF,LA,APK, r2 (eqn. 2.12). The error term εt is autoregressive of order p
(eqn. 2.13).
Levels equation:
Differenced equation:
 yt
∆yt
 = β
 x′t
∆x′t
+
 εt
∆εt
 (2.12)
εt is AR(p) εt =
p∑
k=1
ρkεt−k + ωt (2.13)
Exogeneity of Instruments
When the endogenous regressor is persistent, lags and lag differences of the endoge-
nous regressors sufficiently removed from the contemporaneous error term are exoge-
nous (derivation shown in appendix). For example, suppose that endogenous xt is
persistent (AR1) and also correlated with the error term εt (eqn. 2.14).
xit = αxt−1 + εt (2.14)
If εt is AR(0), then in the levels equation, 1 or more period lagged change of
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∆xt−a, a > 0 is exogenous to the error term εt (eqn. 2.15).
∆xt−1 = (αxt−2 + εt−1)− (αxt−3 + εt−2)
= (αxt−2 − αxt−3) + (εt−1 − εt−2) (2.15)
In the levels equation, ∆xt−a,∀a > p is used to instrument for the endogenous
regressors xt (eqn. 2.16). In the differenced equation, xt−(a+1),∀a > p is used to
instrument for the endogenous regressors ∆xt (eqn. 2.16) (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
System GMM combines the moment conditions for the transformed model with the
moment conditions for the levels model (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Compared to
estimating the differenced equation alone, system GMM improves the finite sample
properties regards to bias and root mean squared error.
E(∆xt−aεt) = 0,
E(xt−(a+1)∆εt) = 0,
∀a > p (2.16)
System GMM requires strong assumptions regarding the lags and lag differences
of the endogenous regressors. Satisfying the required assumptions to make the sys-
tem GMM identification strategy work would be considered special circumstances.
Validity of the assumptions are rigorously tested later in the paper.
A previous study using system GMM identification strategy for estimating hos-
pital productivity yielded similar results to alternative identification strategies for
production functions (Lee et al., 2013). System GMM producing similar results to
alternative identification strategies provide support for the validity of using system
GMM with hospital financial data.
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Strength of Instruments
In the levels equation, lagged change ∆xt−1 is used to instrument for xt. ∆xt−1 is
related to xt by (α−1 − α−2) (derivation shown in appendix).
∆xt−1 = (α−1 − α−2)xt − (α−1 − α−2)εt + α−1εt−1 (2.17)
In the differenced equation, xt−2 is used to instrument for ∆xt. xt−2 is related to
∆xt by 1α2−α (derivation shown in appendix).
xt−2 =
1
α2 − α∆xt −
1
α
εt−1 − 1
α2 − αεt (2.18)
Problem of Weak Instruments
Problem of weak instrument arises in both levels equation and differenced equation
when there is strong persistence or when α approaches 1. In equation (2.17), if α = 1
then (α−1 − α−2) = 0. Thus ∆xit is no longer related to xit−2. In equation (2.18),
if α = 1 then (α2 − α) = 0. Thus xit−2 is no longer related to ∆xit. System GMM
addresses the weak instrument problem by jointly estimating the system of levels and
differenced equation (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
2.3.4 Data
The state of California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
(OSHPD, 2012) collects financial data from about 450 not for profit and for-profit
hospitals in California each year, this study used data from 2002-2011. Participat-
ing hospitals report detailed financial information from balance sheets and income
statements. OSHPD data includes all non-federal California hospitals. The study
sample was limited to short-term general (acute-care) hospitals. Kaiser Permanente
21
hospitals were excluded because they do not report comparable financial data. Hos-
pitals with reporting days less or greater than 365 (less or greater than 366 for leap
years) were excluded. 311 hospitals (3,168 observations) remained. Then missing and
out of range values, probably resulting from data entry error, were excluded. The
remaining 309 hospitals with an unbalanced panel of 2,930 hospital-year observations
were analyzed. Dollar amounts were adjusted to 2010 using GDP deflator.
2.4 Results
A descriptive analysis of the study hospitals is summarized in table 2.1. Pooling across
ownership types, hospitals had a mean annual capital investment of 18.95 million
dollars, capital stock of 178.72 million dollars, and investment per capital ratio of
0.11. Ownership differences showed that investor owned hospital invested relatively
more than others with a higher investment per capital ratio. Investor owned hospitals
also generated greater returns from a dollar of capital with a higher APK than others.
Investor owned hospitals had the smallest capital stock, about a quarter of the size
of not for profit hospitals and half the size of public hospitals. The study population
was comprised of 58% not for profit hospitals, 20% investor owned hospitals, and 22%
public hospitals.
Figure 2.7 shows the investment time trend separately plotted for hospitals with
high operating cash flow and low operating cash flow, defined as operating cash flow
above and below the median, respectively. High operating cash flow hospitals had an
increasing investment trend from 2002 to 2008 then a decreasing trend from 2008 to
2012. Low operating cash flow hospitals increased investment from 2003 to 2007 then
decreased from 2007 to 2010.
During the recession I expected hospitals to be liquidity constrained. When liq-
uidity constrained, high operating cash flow hospitals should invest more than low
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of CA Short-Term General Hospitals, 2002-2012
All NFP IO Public
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
I/K .11 .11 .14 .1
(.23) (.16) (.42) (.12)
I (Investments, $ mil. ) 18.95 25.59 6.36 12.72
(39.86) (47.14) (15.12) (28.99)
K (Capital, $ mil) 178.72 236.41 60.04 134.83
(250.1) (289.95) (64.36) (188.36)
CF (Cash Flow, $ mil) 19.66 24.52 9.35 16.58
(47.92) (46.87) (34.15) (59.02)
LA (Liquid Ast., $ mil) 19.54 26.27 1.99 18.45
(52.92) (63.37) (5.23) (42.49)
APK (Operating Rev / K) 1.71 1.41 2.87 1.42
(1.36) (.88) (2.01) (1.03)
r (Int. Rate LT Debt, %) 5.77 5.4 8.01 5.66
(1.96) (1.73) (2.53) (1.43)
N obs 2930 1713 582 635
Source: OSHPD 28th Year (2002-2003) to 38th Year (2012-2013)
In millions of 2011 dollars
operating cash flow hospitals because hospitals are limited in how much they can
borrow and must use their own operating cash flow to fund investments. Time trend
in figure 2.7 is consistent with this expectation in that during the recession high oper-
ating cash flow hospitals invested more than low operating cash flow hospitals. There
is a clear separation between high and low operating cash flow hospitals between 2008
and 2010.
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Figure 2.7: Mean Capital Investment per Dollar of Capital by Cash Flow
Source: OSHPD 28th Year (2002-2003) to 38th Year (2012-2013)
I estimated the empirical model (2.11) using system GMM. Estimates are stratified
by pre-recession (2002-2006), during recession (2008-2010), and recovery (2011-2012).
In addition to GMM estimates, fixed effects estimates are reported for comparison.
Pre-recession period estimates are presented in table 2.2. Operating cash flow and
liquid assets were not significantly related to investment per capital for all hospitals,
suggesting that hospitals were not liquidity constrained in the pre-recession period.
Investment per capital was significantly related to the profitability of capital. The
coefficient estimate for APKit+1 was significant and positive (.0331 ; p-val ≤ 0.001).
The GMM estimate for APKit+1 was smaller than the FE estimate (.1155 ; p-val
≤ 0.001), which implies that managerial performance was positively biasing APKit+1.
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Table 2.2: Pre-Recession 2002-2006 Estimates
All FE GMM
I/Kit (1) (2)
CF/Kit -.0168 .0061
( .0143) ( .0372)
LA/Kit .0625 .2315
( .0705) ( .1184)
APKit+1 .1155 *** .0331 ***
( .0341) ( .0076)
rit+1 -.0021 ** -.0022
( 7.0e-04) ( .0061)
2003 -.0143 * -.0149
( .0065) ( .0092)
2004 -.0117 -.0013
( .0096) ( .0109)
2005 .0078 -.0072
( .0146) ( .0119)
2006 -.0046 -.0114
( .0092) ( .0123)
constant -.0721 .0387
( .0547) ( .0394)
AB test for AR(2) p-val .388
Hansen p-val .12
N instruments 37
N obs 1333 1091
N hospitals 263 250
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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Recession period estimates are presented in table 2.3. Operating cash flow was
significantly related to investment per capital, suggesting that hospitals were liquidity
constrained during the recession. Increasing operating cash flow increased investment
per capital (.1309 ; p-val ≤ 0.01). The GMM estimate for operating cash flow was
larger than the FE estimate (.0932 ; p-val ≤ 0.001), which imply quality was nega-
tively biasing operating cash flow.
The coefficient estimate for APKit+1 was significant and positive (.0307 ; p-val
≤ 0.01). Again, the GMM estimate for APKit+1 was smaller than the FE estimate.
The APKit+1 coefficient during the recession was smaller than the pre-recession es-
timate, suggesting that investment decisions was less sensitive to the profitability of
capital during the recession. Liquidity constrained hospitals would be limited in their
borrowing, which may prohibit hospitals from investing even when there are profitable
investment opportunities.
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Table 2.3: During-Recession 2008-2010 Estimates
All FE GMM
I/Kit (1) (2)
CF/Kit .0932 *** .1309 **
( .0217) ( .0454)
LA/Kit -.0435 -.045
( .0531) ( .0724)
APKit+1 .0527 ** .0307 **
( .0192) ( .0107)
rit+1 -3.0e-04 -.0014
( 4.7e-04) ( .0114)
2009 .0174 * -.0227 **
( .0072) ( .0085)
2010 .0032 -.0115
( .0077) ( .0096)
constant .0164 .0712
( .0328) ( .061)
AB test for AR(2) p-val .104
Hansen p-val .215
N instruments 81
N obs 669 664
N hospitals 247 236
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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Recovery period estimates are presented in table 2.4. Operating cash flow and
liquid assets were not significantly related to investment per capital, suggesting that
hospitals were not liquidity constrained. The coefficient estimate for APKit+1 was
significant and positive (.0457 units ; p-val ≤ 0.01). The APKit+1 coefficient during
the recovery was larger than the recession estimate, suggesting that hospitals were
able to finance profitable investments by borrowing.
Table 2.4: Recovery 2011-2012 Estimates
All FE GMM
I/Kit (1) (2)
CF/Kit .081 .0807
( .1102) ( .0767)
LA/Kit -.0461 -.0488
( .0571) ( .0694)
APKit+1 .0166 .0457 **
( .0437) ( .0171)
rit+1 -.0089 ** .0215
( .0033) ( .0301)
2012 .0333 .0244 *
( .0371) ( .0118)
constant .127 -.0961
( .0882) ( .1467)
AB test for AR(2) p-val .
Hansen p-val .463
N instruments 56
N obs 890 445
N hospitals 253 237
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Table 2.5 shows the during-recession GMM estimates by ownership. Not for profit
hospital investment was sensitive to operating cash flow (.1878 ; p-val ≤ 0.05). Public
hospital investment was sensitive to liquid assets (.0871 ; p-val ≤ 0.05). Investor
owned hospital investment was not related to operating cash flow or liquid assets.
These results suggest that during the recession, not for profit and public hospitals
were liquidity constrained, but investor owned hospitals were not.
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Table 2.5: During-Recession 2008-2010 Estimates by Ownership
GMM NFP IO PUB
I/Kit (1) (2) (3)
CF/Kit .1878 * .2123 -.0668
( .0866) ( .1365) ( .0745)
LA/Kit -.1949 -.3568 .0871 *
( .1073) ( .5883) ( .0406)
APKit+1 .083 * .0619 * -.0078
( .0396) ( .0293) ( .0109)
rit+1 .011 -.095 .0048
( .0153) ( .0962) ( .0165)
2009 .0011 -.0506 .0015
( .0094) ( .0554) ( .0166)
2010 -.0033 .1371 .0093
( .0141) ( .1714) ( .022)
constant -.0626 .667 .0788
( .0951) ( .6955) ( .0933)
AB test for AR(2) p-val .28 .47 .997
Hansen p-val .217 .441 .481
N instruments 51 27 60
N obs 429 75 160
N hospitals 150 30 57
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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System GMM diagnostic tests supported the validity of the system GMM esti-
mates. In each of the tables presented, the Hansen test of joint validity of the instru-
ments failed to reject the null, showing no evidence that the instruments were not
exogenous. Also, over-instrumenting did not appear to be a problem, as the Hansen
test statistic was reasonably far from 1.00 (Roodman, 2009). The Arellano-Bond test
for AR(2) in first differences failed to reject the null, showing no evidence of AR(1)
auto correlation in the levels equation.
The Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) technique was
used to decompose the change in hospital capital investment between pre-recession
and during recession. The hospital observations from 2006 were selected as the pre-
recession group. Observations from 2009 were selected as the recession group. Using
the GMM coefficient estimates from tables 2.2 and 2.3, capital investment was pre-
dicted in term of dollars and then separated into the following components.
Y1 : Investment ($ Millions) Recession
Y0 : Investment ($ Millions) Pre-Recession
∆E(Y ) = E(Y1)− E(Y0)
= (α1 + µ1 + β1X1)− (α0 + µ0 + β0X0)
= (α1 − α0) + (µ1 − µ0) + (β1 − β0)X1 + (X1 −X0) β0
= (α1 − α0) + (µ1 − µ0) +(
βCF1 − βCF0
)
CF1 + (CF1 − CF0) βCF0 +(
βLA1 − βLA0
)
LA1 + (LA1 − LA0) βLA0 +(
βAPK1 − βAPK0
)
APK1 + (APK1 − APK0) βAPK0
(βr1 − βr0) r1 + (r1 − r0) βAPK0
(2.19)
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The effect of the recession through change in the estimated coefficients was cap-
tured by (β1 − β0)X1: Coefficients effect. Difference in investment due to the change
in the explanatory variables was captured by (X1 −X0) β0: Change in variables effect.
The effect of the recession due to the difference in the estimated intercepts was cap-
tured by (α1 − α0) + (µ1 − µ0) : Residual effect. Standard errors for decomposition
were estimated by block bootstrapping the hospitals.
Table 2.6 summarizes the decomposed change in hospital capital investment be-
tween pre-recession and during recession. The residual recession effect is the change
in baseline capital investment between the pre-recession and during recession group.
The residual recession effect absorbs the change in capital investment unexplained by
the predictors in the empirical model. The residual recession effect was not significant.
During the recession, hospital investment was related to operating cash flow, while
pre-recession it was not. The operating cash flow coefficient effect (change in capital
investment due to the change in the cash flow coefficient pre-recession and during
recession) increased capital investment by $2.5 million (CI:.57,4.44). Change in op-
erating cash flow between the pre-recession group and the recession group was not
statistically different. The APKit+1 coefficient effect, change in APKit+1, interest
rate coefficient effect, change in interest rate were not statistically different between
the pre-recession and the recession group.
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Table 2.6: Decomposition of Change in Expected Investment Due to the Recession
E(Investment 2009)- E(Investment 2006) ∆Estimate [Bootstrap 95% CI]
I. Cash Flow Effect 2.5* .57 4.44
II. Change in Cash Flow -.28 -.66 .11
III. Liquid Asset Effect -2.39 -6.85 2.07
IV. Change in Liquid Asset .54 -.34 1.43
V. APK Effect -1.91 -8.02 4.21
VI. Change in APK .48 -.16 1.13
VII. Interest Rate Effect 11.92 -11.01 34.86
VIII. Change in Interest Rate Effect -.03 -1.15 1.08
IX. Residual Recession Effect -9.26 -33.41 14.89
Net Effect 1.59 -1.87 5.04
Notes: * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Millions of 2011 Dollars; Bootstrap reps:1000
2.5 Robustness Tests
2.5.1 Validity of GMM Instruments
Overidentifying restrictions in system GMM may be tested by the Hansen J statistic
(Hansen, 1982). Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the instruments violate
the orthogonality conditions either because they are not exogenous or because they
are being incorrectly excluded from the regression. A large set of excluded instruments
weakens the power of the Hansen test. The difference-in-Hansen test or the C test is
used to test the validity of a subset of instruments. Rejection of the null hypothesis
signals that the subset of instruments are not valid.
Table 2.7 shows the test of instrument exogeneity. The difference-in-Hansen test
separately evaluates the exogeneity of instruments for each endogenous regressor. A
p-value less than 0.1 suggests that the instrument may be endogenous. The Arellano-
Bond test for AR(2) with a p-value less than 0.05 suggests that the error term is
serially correlated, thus instruments are invalid. The Hansen test is the overall test
of instrument exogeneity and a p-value less than 0.1 suggests that the instrument
set may be endogenous (Roodman, 2009). Overall, the test did not find a significant
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endogeneity problem in the lags and lag differences used as instruments.
Table 2.7: Test of Instrument Exogeneity
Xt−2
and
∆Xt−1
only
Xt−3
and
∆Xt−2
only
Xt−4
and
∆Xt−3
only
Xt−5
and
∆Xt−4
only
Xt−6
and
∆Xt−5
only
Diff-in-Hansen Test p-val
CF/Kit .799 .502 .806 .327 .623
LA/Kit .775 .181 .649 .431 .824
APKit+1 .969 .769 .561 .7 .732
rit+1 .319 .634 .98 .7 .809
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test
p-val
.238 .448 .279 .148 .294
Hansen Test p-val .579 .613 .893 .871 .883
Instruments 85 77 69 61 53
Instruments suspected to be endogenous have a p-val < 0.1
System GMM estimations often use a large set of excluded instruments, weakening
the Hansen test (Roodman, 2009). System GMM estimations should be tested for
sensitivity to reductions in number of instruments using the Hansen test and the
difference-in-Hansen test to ensure that the instruments truly satisfy the orthogonality
conditions.
Table 2.8 compares how the system GMM estimates changed with the reduced
number of instruments. The system GMM Estimate using all of the available lags
and lag differences as instruments is the reference case (column 1). Column 2 reduced
the instruments to second to fourth lags and first to third lag differences. Column 3
reduced the instruments to second lag and first lag differences. The coefficient esti-
mates do not appear to be sensitive to reduction in instruments. They are generally
in the same direction and magnitude. Also, the reduction of instruments does not
reveal an endogeneity problem, as all Hansen test p-values were above 0.1.
Reducing the number of instruments would diminish the effectiveness of system
GMM in expunging endogeneity. As the number of instruments decreased going
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from column 1 to column 3, the coefficient estimate on operating cash flow became
smaller. This is consistent with the results suggesting quality may be negatively
biasing operating cash flow. The coefficient on APKit+1 increased from column 1 to
column 3, which is consistent with managerial performance exerting a positive bias.
Table 2.8: Test of Instrument Reduction
All GMM all lags GMM lag 2-4 GMM lag 2
I/Kit (1) (2) (3)
CF/Kit .0436 .0362 .0307
( .0337) ( .0325) ( .0407)
LA/Kit 2.8e-04 .0061 -.0456
( .04) ( .0336) ( .0397)
APKit+1 .0253 *** .0292 *** .0406 ***
( .0068) ( .0083) ( .0062)
rit+1 -.0116 -.0084 -.0062
( .0083) ( .0064) ( .0089)
AB test for AR(2) p-val .21 .241 .233
Hansen p-val .137 .211 .404
N instruments 229 145 85
N obs 2419 2419 2419
N hospitals 280 280 280
Source: OSHPD 28th Year (2002-2003) to 38th Year (2012-2013).
Coefficients for time dummies not shown.
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
2.5.2 Strength of GMM Instruments
There is no established method in the literature for jointly testing the weakness of the
lag and lag differences instrument set in system GMM. Alternatively, a test for weak
instruments in two stage least squares regression (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and
Yogo, 2002) was adapted for testing the strength of instruments used in system GMM
(Wintoki et al., 2012). The adapted F-test indicates the strength of the instruments
but inference about their consistency is limited because GMM jointly estimates the
levels and differenced equations.
The system of levels and differenced equation were split and tested separately
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using the F-statistics from the first stage regression. In the levels equation, first stage
F-statistics test the strength of lag differences instruments ∆xit−(a+1) , ∀a ≥ 2 on
the endogenous regressors xit. In the differenced equation, first stage F-statistics
test the strength of lag instruments xit−(a) , ∀a ≥ 2 on the endogenous regressors
∆xit. An F-statistic less than the ‘rule of thumb’ critical value 10 is a sign of weak
instruments. A Cragg-Daniel test is not reported because it is invalid under robust
clustered standard errors.
Table 2.9 presents the results for the test of weak instruments. Operating cash
flow, liquid assets, and APKit+1 had an F-statistic greater than 10 in either the levels
equation or the differenced equation, or both. However, the interest rate suffered
from weak instruments. Joint estimation of the levels equation and the differenced
equation by system GMM should alleviate the weak instrument problem.
Table 2.9: First Stage F-Test of Weak Instruments
Dependent Variable F-statistic p-val
First stage dependent variable is in levels (Xt)
CF/K 27.73 8.8e-52
LA/K 37.65 3.2e-60
APKit+1 68.25 2.2e-77
rit+1 3.349 2.3e-08
First stage dependent variable is in forward orthogonal deviations (∆Xt)
∆CF/K 8.722 2.2e-24
∆LA/K 13.25 2.6e-34
∆APKit+1 14.54 1.0e-36
∆rit+1 2.474 3.3e-05
Stock-Yogo test critical values Critical Value
5% max relative bias 21.34
10% max relative bias 11.19
20% max relative bias 5.95
30% max relative bias 4.15
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2.5.3 Alternative Specifications
I investigated the robustness of my results against alternative specifications of the
empirical model. The effect of cash flow may vary depending on liquid asset. The
interaction term for operating cash flow and liquid asset should capture the substitu-
tion effect between the two. System GMM estimates for the pre-recession, recession,
recovery periods including the interaction term between operating cash flow and liq-
uid asset (appendix table A1, A2, A3) showed consistent results with hospitals being
sensitive to cash flow only during the recession period. The interaction term was not
significant in the three periods.
Investment may be persistent over time. Dynamic specification (eqn. 2.20) in-
cluded the lagged dependent and independent variables to test for the presence of an
autoregressive(1) error component. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
was not significant, thus failing to reject the absence of serial correlation in the error
term.
IKit
Kit
= cons+ β1
CFit
Kit
− ρβ1CFit−1
Kit−1
+ β2
LAit
Kit
− ρβ2LAit−1
Kit−1
+ β3
CFit
Kit
∗ LAit
Kit
− ρβ3CFit−1
Kit−1
∗ LAit−1
Kit−1
+ β4rt+1 − ρβ4rt + β5APKt+1 − ρβ5APKt
+ ρ
IKit−1
Kit−1
+ ωt − ρωt−1 + µi − ρµi + it (2.20)
The theoretical model and the subsequent empirical model do not explicitly in-
clude debt as a predictor of capital investment. However, debt may be correlated
with the interest rate, because a lender may evaluate existing debt and interest ex-
penses. Debt is also correlated with capital investment because it is a funding source
for capital investments. Including debt as a predictor in the empirical model did not
change the coefficient estimates for operating cash flow and APKt+1. Also, debt was
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not a significant predictor.
The interest rate in the empirical model was defined as the average interest rate
on long term debt. Long term debt took about five to ten years to mature and
it did not vary greatly from year to year, which may explain why the interest rate
was never a significant predictor. Alternatively, I tested average interest expense per
debt as a proxy for interest rate and it was not a significant predictor. The problem
with average interest expense per debt was that some hospitals had interest expenses
greater than debt making the ratio implausible.
Although the recession was dated between 2007 and 2009 nationally, the effect of
the recession may have lagged for the hospital industry. A drop in employer sponsored
insurance would have lagged behind the recession because the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) allows people who lost their jobs to continue
their coverage. To account for the lag, years 2008 to 2010 was set as the recession
period and 2002-2006 was set as the pre-recession period. Year 2007 was excluded
because it was a transition period, with 11 months out of the year not in recession.
Including 2007 in the pre-recession period did not change the results.
2.6 Discussion
During the recession hospitals’ capital investment was linked to operating cash flow,
which is an evidence of liquidity constraint. The fixed effects estimates which suffers
from endogeneity problem underestimated the relationship between operating cash
flow and investment compared to system GMM estimates. The negative bias on
operating cash flow may be due to unobserved quality improvement spending.
Liquidity constraint arises when lenders are uncertain about hospitals’ ability to
service their debt and consequently limit how much hospitals could borrow. Had
there been a perfectly functioning capital market, operating cash flow would not have
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been related to investments. Liquidity constraint drives hospitals to generate large
operating cash flows to fund capital investments rather than spending on expenses
related to the provision of health care. Hospital management can reduce expenses by
cutting hospital staff, delaying wage payments, and closing service lines. Trading off
operating expenses for capital investment may have adverse short run consequences.
A reduction in hospital staff may worsen patient outcomes by increasing provider
error.
The effect of operating cash flow on investment varied by hospital ownership.
During the recession, capital investment of not for profit and public hospitals were
sensitive to operating cash flow but capital investment of investor owned hospitals
were not. These findings suggest that during the recession, not for profit and public
hospitals were liquidity constrained but investor owned hospitals were not. Investor
owned hospitals can raise equity to fund capital investments, while not for profit and
public hospitals can not. This institutional difference makes investor owned hospitals
less susceptible to liquidity constraint.
Decomposing the change in hospital capital investment between pre-recession and
during recession did not reveal a significant drop in capital investment. The average
decrease in capital investment is the change in capital investment holding constant
the effects of operating cash flow and other predictors in the empirical model. This
change in capital investment unexplained by the model, or the residual effect, includes
the net of the pre-recession year fixed effect and the during recession fixed effect.
Thus any policy changes affecting capital investment would be captured by the
residual effect. However the large uncertainty around the estimated residual effect
makes it unclear how policy changes, such as the government stimulus funds going to
hospitals through ARRA, affected hospital capital investment.
Hospitals responded to the recession by using operating cash flow to offset the
effect of restricted borrowing. Capital investment was more sensitive to operating cash
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flow during the recession, which increased capital investment by $2.5 million other
things equal. The operating cash flow effect isolates change in capital investment
due to the change in coefficient estimate for the pre-recession group and the during
recession group.
A liquidity constrained hospital with poor operating cash flow is likely to fall
behind on the capital investment necessary for its operations and face the risk of
closure. Hospital closure is devastating to a community because access to health care
will deteriorate, especially in rural areas where hospitals are far apart. Also, the
community’s economy will suffer because hospitals are often large employers.
Hospitals with low operating cash flows tend to be small rural hospitals that pro-
vide care to underserved populations. During economic recessions when poor financial
performance is due to the external environment rather than the hospital’s manage-
ment, access to debt is critical for hospitals to endure the recession. Policy changes
that reduce payments to hospitals may discourage liquidity constrained hospitals from
investing in capital.
The relationship between APKit+1 and capital investment diminished during the
recession, although it was not statistically significant. Capital investments may have
been forgone during the recession because of greater uncertainty regarding returns
from the investment, even though these investments may have been be profitable. The
implications of the forgone profitable investment for patient welfare depend on who
is the residual claimant of hospital profits. Profits from investment may be returned
to the community, which in theory defines not for profit organizations, or may be
used to improve the quality of hospital service. Decreased profits from investment
would decrease patient welfare because less residual surplus is returned to patients.
However, forgoing profitable investment that provides no medical benefit to patients
but only generates profits for the hospital manager would be beneficial to patient
welfare.
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My study provides evidence of liquidity constraint among not for profit and pub-
lic hospitals during the recession. The theoretical cause of this liquidity constraint
is asymmetric information, a market failure that warrants policy intervention. Com-
pared to the private bond market, municipal bond market disclosure requirements
have much room for improvement regarding timeliness, frequency, and completeness.
The lack of transparency in the financial disclosures of not for profit hospitals may
have disastrous consequence such as the failure of the Allegheny Health Education
and Research Foundation (AHERF). Policy interventions that mitigate the problem
of asymmetric information between hospitals and lenders may alleviate liquidity con-
straint in economic downturns. Improving hospital access to debt for investing in
new equipment and facilities is important for maintaining and improving the quality
of hospital services.
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Chapter 3
Cost Effectiveness of Telecare
Management for Pain and Depression
in Patients with Cancer: Results from
a Randomized Trial
This paper has been published. Choi Yoo, S. J., Nyman, J. A., Cheville, A. L., and
Kroenke, K. (2014). Cost effectiveness of telecare management for pain and depression
in patients with cancer: results from a randomized trial. General hospital psychiatry,
36(6), 599-606.
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41
3.1 Introduction
Pain and depression are two of the most prevalent and disabling symptoms among
patients with cancer yet frequently are undetected and undertreated (Carr et al.,
2002; Bottomley, 1998; Caraceni and Portenoy, 1999; Portenoy and Lesage, 1999;
Given et al., 2001, 1994; Kurtz et al., 2001; Stommel et al., 2002; Fallowfield et al.,
2001; Passik et al., 1998; Sharpe et al., 2004; Cleeland et al., 1994; Cleeland, 1998;
Deandrea et al., 2008; Apolone et al., 2009). Telecare interventions have been shown
to be effective at managing pain and depression among primary care patients, across a
variety of health care settings, from large health systems to rural hospitals (Carr et al.,
2002; Bottomley, 1998; Caraceni and Portenoy, 1999; Portenoy and Lesage, 1999;
Kroenke, 2007; Sheehan et al., 1996; Wagner et al., 1993; Rost et al., 2001; Cintron
and Morrison, 2006). Extending telecare to management of pain and depression in
patients with cancer is an emerging area of clinical and research interest spurred
by a long-standing failure to adequately manage disabling symptoms among cancer
populations (Cleeland, 1998; Deandrea et al., 2008; Apolone et al., 2009).
The Indiana Cancer Pain and Depression (INCPAD) trial evaluated the effective-
ness of centralized telecare management coupled with automated symptommonitoring
for patients with cancer. The INCPAD trial was conducted in 16 community-based
geographically-dispersed urban and rural oncology practices in Indiana and showed
that telecare management improved both cancer-related pain and depression over the
12 months of the trial (Kroenke et al., 2010). In the present paper, we investigate the
cost effectiveness of the INCPAD telecare intervention. New contributions made by
this paper include mapping of information from outcome assessment questionnaires
into depression-free days and quality-adjusted life years, accounting for intervention
costs, and a regression analysis of the effectiveness measures to allow comparisons
with other pain and depression management interventions.
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3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Experimental Design and Sample
The INCPAD trial design (Kroenke et al., 2009) and its effectiveness in reducing
pain and depression (Kroenke et al., 2010) have been previously described. Patients
presenting for oncology clinic visits were screened for depression and pain. Patients
who screened positive for depression or pain were contacted for a telephone eligibility
interview to determine if they had clinically significant depression or pain. Depression
had to be at least moderately severe, defined as a Patient Health Questionnaire nine-
item depression scale (PHQ-9) score ≥ 10 and endorsement of either depressed mood
and/or anhedonia. Pain had to be: (a) definitely or possibly cancer-related; (b)
at least moderately severe, defined as a score of ≥ 6 on the "worst pain in the
past week" item of the Brief Pain Inventory. Excluded were individuals who did
not speak English, had moderately severe cognitive impairment, schizophrenia or
other psychosis, had a pending pain-related disability claim, were pregnant, or were
in hospice care. Informed consent and HIPAA release were obtained from eligible
patients who desired to participate.
Of the 405 eligible participants who consented to enroll in the study, 202 patients
were randomized to the intervention group and 203 to the usual-care group. Random-
ization was stratified by symptom type: 131 patients had depression only, 96 had pain
only, and 178 had both depression and pain. Patient mean age was 58.8 years, and
68% were women. The type of cancer was breast (29%), lung (20%), gastrointesti-
nal (17%), lymphoma or hematological (13%), genitourinary (10%, and other (10%).
The phase of cancer was newly-diagnosed (37%), disease-free or maintenance therapy
(42%), and recurrent or progressive (20%).
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3.2.2 Outcomes
Outcomes were assessed by blinded telephone interviews over 12 months (baseline
and at months 1, 3, 6, and 12, with some of the outcomes assessed less frequently).
Depression, pain, mental health, and disability outcomes were used to estimate the
depression-free days and quality adjusted life years (QALY) associated with the in-
tervention.
Depression-free days (DFD) during the 12-month follow-up period were calculated
from the HSCL-20 scores (Lave et al., 1998; Simon et al., 2001). At each assessment,
patients received a portion of a DFD for that day according to the following algorithm:
if patients had a HSCL-20 score of 0.50 or less, they were coded as having one DFD;
if patients had HSCL-20 score of 2.00 or greater, zero DFDs; and if patients scored
between 0.50 and 2.00, they were assigned a DFD value between zero and one by
linear interpolation (e.g., a HSCL-20 score of 1.25 was coded as 0.5 DFD). DFDs
between assessments (intervals of baseline to month 1, month 1 to month 3, etc.)
were calculated by averaging the DFDs between the two assessments and multiplying
by the number of days between assessments. DFDs between assessments were summed
for all assessment intervals to yield the number of DFDs during the 12 month follow-
up.
DFDs were calculated two ways, depending on how the missing follow-up assess-
ments were coded. The first measure excluded patients who had missing follow-up
assessments or died during the trial. The second imputed DFDs by: (1) carrying the
last observation forward to impute the missing follow-up assessment, and (2) includ-
ing patients who died up to their last assessment prior to death. Patients who died
before their month 1 assessment were excluded from imputation.
QALYs were calculated using four methods. First, QALYs were derived from DFDs
(Wells and Sherbourne, 1999; Revicki and Wood, 1998; Fryback et al., 1993; Pyne
et al., 2010; Unützer et al., 1997; Schoenbaum, 2001). Previous literature estimated
44
that depression corresponds to a 0.2 to 0.4 decrement in quality-of-life weights, so
one year of depression would reduce QALYs by the same decrement. The number of
depression-free days out of the year would correspond to a proportional reduction in
QALYs. For example, a reduction of 30 depression-free days is equivalent to a 0.016 to
0.033 reduction in QALYs, depending on whether 0.2 or 0.4 was used. Second, patient
responses to the SF-12 were used to generate preference-based quality-of-life weights
(Brazier and Roberts, 2004). Third, a modified EQ-5D survey was construction from
the responses to a combination of depression, pain, mental health, and disability items
from various questionnaires and used to generate quality-of-life weights (Shaw et al.,
2005) (Appendix 1). Fourth, a visual analog scale on a 0-10 scale was used to measure
quality of life during the past month at each assessment. Quality-of-life weights at
each assessment were rescaled to 0 to 1 and QALYs were calculated by area under
the time curves.
3.2.3 Costs
Costs were calculated from a payer’s perspective. Intervention cost per patient was
determined using provider payroll data and capital expenditure associated with the
intervention. The nurse care manager time devoted to each study patient was main-
tained in a detailed log, and physician time spent in weekly care management con-
ferences and staffing outside of these weekly meetings was determined. Using annual
salaries including fringe rates of the physician supervisor and nurse care manager
combined with the hours they devoted to the study over the course of the INCPAD
trial allowed us to calculate physician and nurse costs. Further details regarding cost
determinations are provided in Appendix 2.
Capital expenditures for startup and maintenance of the automated symptom
monitoring were included as an intervention cost. Automated symptom monitoring
costs can be spread over a number of patients hence intervention cost per patient will
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decrease with increasing number of patients. Also, after paying these startup costs,
subsequent maintenance costs are fairly low. However, the cost of purchasing the
automated symptom monitoring may vary depending on the purchasing power of the
buyer.
Since INCPAD involved multiple community-based practices across the state of In-
diana, it was not possible to obtain prescription or other medical cost data. However,
neither patient-reported health care use nor co-interventions differed significantly be-
tween the intervention and the usual care group (Kroenke et al., 2010).
3.2.4 Analysis
Incremental intervention costs and effectiveness were calculated separately for (a.)
all 202 patients in the intervention group, including those who had only pain, only
depression, or both pain and depression; and (b.) the subset of 154 patients in the
intervention group with depression, including those with only depression and those
with both pain and depression. This is because the cost-effectiveness analyses based
upon the SF-12 and EQ-5D used the full sample of 405 patients (202 intervention
and 203 control), while the analysis based upon DFDs used the 309 patients with
depression (154 intervention and 155 control). Physician and nurse time cost was
calculated based on administrative data on annual salary plus fringe and hours spent
on the intervention during the year (Appendix 2).
The effect of the intervention on each outcome measure (DFDs, SF-12 quality-of-
life weights, visual analog scale, and modified EQ-5D quality-of-life weights) at each
assessment timepoint (month 1, 3, 6, and 12 for visual analog scale, DFDs, and the
modified EQ-5D; month 3 and 12 for the SF-12) was estimated using OLS regression,
controlling for baseline value of the outcome measure, age, gender, education, race,
marital status, employment, and income. Each outcome at a given assessment month
was modeled separately in cross-sectional regressions. Coefficients of the intervention
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dummy variable were used to test for significance of the intervention effect. Since
the intervention was centralized and telephone-administered to patients throughout
the entire state of Indiana, we did not expect an unobserved hospital or clinic level
effect in these randomized data. Accordingly, those variables were omitted from the
regression.
Based on the regression coefficients, average outcomes (DFD, SF-12 quality-of-life
weights, modified EQ-5D quality-of-life weights) for the intervention group and the
intervention group were predicted holding the covariates at observed values (Schoen-
baum, 2001; Pyne et al., 2010). The area under the curve that captured the predicted
quality-of- life weights over time was used to calculate QALYs. As mentioned earlier,
the analysis for DFD was done with and without imputation. Analyses for SF-12 and
EQ-5D were done only without imputation. Quality-of-life weights derived from the
visual analog scale were not significantly different between the intervention and usual
care group and therefore no further cost-effectiveness calculations were performed.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Costs
Table 3.1 summarizes the costs attributable to the intervention. Total physician time
cost to treat all intervention patients was $43,226 and the resulting physician cost
per patient was $214. Total physician time cost to treat the patients with depression
was $43,226 and the resulting physician cost per patient was $281. Total nurse care
manager time cost to treat all intervention patients was $71,224 and the resulting
total nurse care manager cost per patient was $353. Total nurse care manager time
cost to treat the patients with depression was $61,906 and the resulting total nurse
care manager cost per patient was $402.
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Table 3.1: Costs of INCPAD Intervention for Entire Trial and 12-Month Per Patients
Costs*
The cost of the automated monitoring system and its maintenance during the trial
was $78,000. Spread out over all intervention patients, monitoring cost per patient
was $386. Spread out over the patients with depression, monitoring cost per patient
was $506. The sum of the physician, nurse care manager, and monitoring cost was
$953 per patient for all intervention patients and $1189 per patient for the patients
with depression.
Projected costs of the intervention for new patients enrolled after the trial should
decrease because the automated monitoring system is already be set up and only
maintenance costs of the system would be required. Post start up, automated mon-
itoring maintenance cost was estimated to be about $20,000 over the 3 years of the
trial , which would reduce the incremental cost per new intervention patient treated
to about $666 and cost per new depressed patient treated to about $813.
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3.3.2 Effectiveness
OLS regression estimated the effect of the intervention on DFDs controlling for base-
line characteristics. Table 3.2 summarizes the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios.
As previously noted, the regression model for DFD only included the subset of pa-
tients who had depression. From the subset of 309 depressed patients, 187 patients
had complete follow-up, with 90 in the intervention group and 97 in usual care group.
For these patients, predicted average DFD during the 12- month follow-up for the
intervention group was 227.38 days and for the usual care group was 167.08 days.
Thus, the intervention group was associated with an increase of 60.30 depression-free
days (SE=15.38; p<0.01) compared to the usual care group. Based on the existing
estimates of the increase in quality of life of from 0.2 to 0.4 per additional DFD, the
intervention was associated with gain of between 0.033 and 0.066 QALYs.
Table 3.2: INCPAD Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratios
From the subset of 309 depressed patients, 298 patients had either complete or
imputed follow-up data on DFDs, with 148 in the intervention group and 150 in
usual care group. The intervention group was associated with an increase of 44.12
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depression-free days (SE=12.86; p<0.01) compared to the usual care group. The
predicted average DFD during the 12-month follow-up for the intervention group was
185.81 days and for the usual care group was 141.70 days. Based on the existing
estimate of the increase in quality of life in DFDs, the intervention was associated
with gain of between 0.024 and 0.048 QALYs.
Quality-of-life weights from SF-12 and modified EQ-5D were also modeled using
OLS regression. The regression model for quality-of-life weights included all patients.
However, patients included in the regression model decreased over time, due to death
or non-response and those with missing data were not imputed. For the SF-12, 405
patients were included at baseline, but diminished to 267 patients at month 12. For
EQ-5D, 362 patients were included at baseline, but fell to 211 patients at month 12.
The effect of the intervention on SF-12 based quality-of- life weight was not sig-
nificant at month 1, but significant at month 12 with intervention group associated
with 0.03 point (SE=0.02; p<0.05) higher quality-of-life weight. The gain in SF-12
quality of life based on the area under the weight curve over 12 months was 0.013
QALYs. The intervention group was associated with significantly higher quality-of-
life weights from the modified EQ-5D at month 1, 3, 6, and 12. Specifically, at month
1, the weights were 0.06 points (SE=0.02; p < 0.01) higher; at month 3, 0.08 points
(SE=0.03; p < 0.05) higher; at month 6, 0.08 points (SE=0.03; p < 0.05) higher; at
month 12, 0.14 points (SE=0.04; p < 0.01) higher. The area under the quality-of-life
weight curve showed a gain of 0.088 QALYs.
3.3.3 Cost effectiveness
The reference case incremental cost-effectiveness ratios were calculated including the
automated monitoring as a startup cost. For patients with depression who completed
the trial without missing follow-ups, incremental cost per DFD gained was $19.72 per
DFD, and $18,018 to $36,035 per QALY gained.
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For patients with depression who either completed follow-ups or whose follow-up
scores were imputed, incremental cost per DFD gained was $26.95, which corresponds
to a cost per QALY gained of between $24,774 to $49,549, when evaluated by the
range in quality-of-life gains found in the literature. For the modified EQ-5D, the
incremental cost for all patients was $10,826 per QALY gained. Cost per QALY
gained from the SF-12 was $73,286.
As a sensitivity analysis, post-start cost-effectiveness ratios were projected for new
patients who might receive the 12-month intervention after the trial. This assumed
similar physician and nurse care manager costs in providing care for a similar number
of patients but lower automated monitoring costs due to the fact the system had
already been set up and only maintenance costs would be required. startup to reflect
lower costs in subsequent years after startup (Tab. 3.3). For patients with depression
who completed the trial without missing follow-ups, post-startup incremental cost per
DFD gained was $13.48, which corresponds to $12,311 to $24,623 per QALY gained.
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Table 3.3: INCPAD Post-Startup Projected Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratios
for New Patients Receiving the Interventions*
For patients with depression who either completed follow-ups or whose responses
were imputed, post-startup incremental cost per DFD gained was $18.42, which cor-
responds to $16,928.13 to $33,856.25 per QALY gained. Post start-up incremental
cost per QALY gained was $7,564 for all patients using the modified EQ-5D weights
and $51,199 using the SF-12 quality-of-life weights.
3.4 Discussion
Centralized telecare management coupled with automated symptom monitoring for
cancer patients with pain and depression significantly increased depression-free days
and associated QALYs compared to usual care. Intervention cost of telecare man-
agement was greater than usual care. The range of point estimates for the incre-
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mental cost-effectiveness ratio calculated from various outcome measures was within
the range of other disease management interventions and generally below $50,000 per
QALY (Lave et al., 1998; Simon et al., 2001; Schoenbaum, 2001; Pyne et al., 2010;
Katon et al., 2005; Bosmans and Bruijne, 2006).
Effectiveness of the INCPAD intervention may persist beyond conclusion of the
intervention. The Improving Mood: Promoting Access to Collaborative Treatment
(IMPACT) trial conducted a 12-month collaborative care management program for
depressed older primary care patients, and found that effectiveness benefits were
sustained at 2-year follow-up and the intervention group had lower healthcare costs
during the 4 year follow-up period (Unutzer et al., 2008; Hunkeler et al., 2006). If
the improved depression outcomes generated by the INCPAD intervention were to
persist beyond the 12 month trial, the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio would be
even lower.
Regarding depression-free days (DFDs), our study in patients with cancer com-
pares favorably to 10 previous studies conducted in primary care populations (Tab.
3.4). The latter have shown that a variety of interventions yield annualized gains in
DFDs of 25.2 to 58 DFDs (compared to 60.2 DFDs in INCPAD) and a cost per DFD
of $2.76 to $35.15 (compared to $19.72 in INCPAD). The cost effectiveness of telecare
management also compares favorably with many other cancer treatments. Some new
anticancer drugs have costs per QALY exceeding $100,000 to $200,000 (Smith and
Hillner, 2011; Hillner and Smith, 2009; Sarin, 2008). Moreover, drivers of increased
costs include not only new drugs but also advances in therapeutic radiology, imaging,
and other treatment (Meropol et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2012). In contrast, the
estimated cost of the INCPAD intervention ranged from $7500 to $75,000 per QALY,
with most CEA methods yielding an estimate under $50,000.
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Table 3.4: Incremental Per Patient Costs and Effectiveness of Depression Care Inter-
ventions Compared to Usual Care
a All studies except that by Choi-Yoo were conducted in primary care populations. An additional primary care
study by Pyne et al. (2010) showed no significant incremental effect of the intervention on depression-free days.
b Int = intervention costs. Dir = other direct health care costs not related to intervention. Ind = indirect costs
c If quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) calculated in article, the method (metric) used to calculate QALYs. DFD =
depression-free days. SF-12 = Medical Outcome Study 12-item Short-Form. EQ5D = 5-item EuroQoL. Global QoL
= single item overall quality of life.
d Some of DFD data and/or cost per DFD not in original article(s) but in summary table in Simon et al 2001 article
[24]
Our cost-effectiveness analysis has three limitations. First, because the INCPAD
trial intervention focused on community-based rural and urban oncology practices
(many of which lacked electronic medical records and integrated health care sys-
tems), our analysis was limited to intervention costs rather than total health care
costs. However, self-reported health care use as well as co-interventions did not dif-
fer significantly between intervention and control groups and, indeed, there was a
trend for lower rates of hospitalization and emergency department use (two of the
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more expensive health care use indicators) in the intervention group (Kroenke et al.,
2010). Thus, it is unlikely that health care costs were higher in the intervention
group. Second, our study found significant improvements in only 3 of the 4 measures
investigated. Third, our study used a novel but untested approach that modeled the
items and responses for the EQ-5D from the responses to questions from other survey
instruments. That this method translated into quality-of-life weight improvements
that were consistent with the improvements found using 2 of the other effectiveness
measures gave us a level of confidence in the validity of this measure.
Although INCPAD focused on depression and pain, telephone-based management
has also proven effective for multiple cancer-related symptoms (Sherwood et al., 2005;
Sikorskii et al., 2007). Cancer symptoms frequently cluster so that many patients
often have more than one type of symptom (Barsevick et al., 2006; Teunissen et al.,
2007; Kroenke et al., 2013). Thus, providing centralized telecare management for a
range of cancer-related symptoms might further enhance its cost-effectiveness. Also,
increasing the number of patients who can have their symptommanagement optimized
at home without the time and travel costs of coming to the clinic makes the care more
convenient and less costly from the perspective of the patient. This was reflected by
the high patient adherence to and satisfaction with the telecare intervention in the
INCPAD trial (Johns et al., 2011). Given the high symptom burden associated with
cancer in all its stages, the responsiveness of symptoms to a cost-effective telecare
management approach makes this a promising avenue for improving quality of life in
cancer patients.
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Chapter 4
Recession Led To A Decline In
Out-Of-Pocket Spending For Children
With Special Health Care Needs
This paper has been published. Karaca-Mandic, P., Choi Yoo, S. J., and Sommers,
B. D. (2013). Recession led to a decline in out-of-pocket spending for children with
special health care needs. Health Affairs, 32(6), 1054-1062.
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4.1 Introduction
The rate of health care spending growth in the United States declined in the period
2008-10, compared to the prior decade. The recession through decreased household
income and savings as well as increased risk of loss both of jobs and of private health
insurance was probably one of the main factors in this trend. As consumers held back
on their use of health services, out-of-pocket health care spending growth slowed from
2009 to 2010. Consumers’ out-of-pocket health care spending increased 1.8 percent
from 2009 to 2010, a rate far below the average annual growth of 4.8 percent from
2000 to 2008 (Martin et al., 2012).
The overall slowdown in health care spending growth may mask substantial hetero-
geneity in terms of whose spending was most affected, which raises several important
policy questions. Was spending differentially affected for adults and for children? Al-
though most children are healthy, forgoing routine health care could have long-term
adverse implications on children’s health.
Furthermore, children with special health care needs require specialized services,
and they are at higher risk of adverse outcomes if they do not receive adequate care
(Lavarreda et al., 2011). Children with special needs represented about 17.9 percent
of all children in 2008, yet they accounted for 47.6 percent of children’s total health
care expenditures in that year (Davis, 2011). This raises a related question: Did the
recession equally affect health care spending for children with and without special
health care needs?
These questions are particularly salient for children in families covered by private
health insurance (as compared to children with public coverage), because such families
have been increasingly subject to higher cost sharing and out-of-pocket burden over
the past decade (Cunningham, 2010; Banthin et al., 2008). Previous research has
shown that although adults had higher rates of unmet or delayed care because of
cost in 2010 than in 2000-with nonelderly adults reporting that they were 66 percent
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more likely to have had unmet medical needs and 79 percent more likely to have had
unmet dental needs in 2010 than in 2000-the rates of unmet need remained stable for
children during this ten-year period, reflecting the availability of public coverage for
children (Kenney et al., 2012).
However, it is possible that privately insured families experienced greater financial
pressure than publicly insured ones to reduce health care use because of the recession.
Moreover, these questions have important implications for understanding whether the
slowing in health care spending growth was disproportionately borne by those with
greater health care needs. Answers to the questions can also provide valuable insights
for policy makers considering future options for children’s and adults’ health care
coverage.
In the study reported here, we examined national trends in out-of-pocket spending
for privately insured families with children in the period 2001-09. We compared out-
of-pocket spending for children with out-of-pocket spending for adults in the same
families. We examined children with and without special health care needs separately.
We tested whether trends in out-of-pocket health care burden were significantly dif-
ferent before and during the recession. Of course, the recession probably also affected
out-of-pocket spending through another mechanism: loss of insurance. However, we
focus here on the quality of coverage for those who remained insured for at least part
of each year.
4.2 Study Data And Methods
4.2.1 Data
We used the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2001-09 Household Compo-
nent Full Year Consolidated Data files and Person Round Plan files in the Household
Component Full Year files. MEPS is a nationally representative survey of the US
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civilian noninstitutionalized population that provides information on health care ac-
cess and use, socioeconomic characteristics, employment, access to care, and related
topics. More information on the survey can be found through the online MEPS
documentation (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2011b).
4.2.2 Study Sample
Our study population included families with children ages 0-17 who were insured at
any time during a given year as dependents on a family member’s private health
insurance policy. In a sensitivity analysis discussed in more detail below, we also
examined children who were covered by private insurance for all twelve months during
a year. Consistent with the MEPS definition, the child’s family included household
members living together, as well as relatives considered usual household members
but not present at the time of the interview, such as college students (Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2011b).
Study samples were stratified into children with and without special health care
needs via the MEPS special health care needs screening instrument (Maternal and
Child Health Bureau, 2007). The Maternal and Child Health Bureau defines children
with special health care needs as “those who have or are at increased risk for a chronic
physical, developmental, behavioral, or emotional condition and who also require
health and related services of a type or amount beyond that required by children
generally” (Maternal and Child Health Bureau, 2007).
4.2.3 Out-Of-Pocket Health Care Burden
MEPS estimates of total expenditures per person include payments from all sources
(public and private) for services to hospitals and emergency departments; physicians
and - providers of dental and other health care; and pharmacies. The questionnaire is
comprehensive in the types of services it asks households to report, with the exception
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of over-the-counter medicines.
The out-of-pocket expenditure variable is the amount paid by the patient or pa-
tient’s family for services received. Health insurance premiums are not included in
out-of-pocket expenditures (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2011b). We
estimated out-of-pocket health care spending for each child and for each adult in the
child’s family. All dollar measures were adjusted to 2009 US dollars using the urban
Consumer Price Index (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011).
4.2.4 Statistical Models
We estimated generalized linear models with the logarithm of out-of-pocket spending
as the dependent variable, time as the primary independent variable of interest, and
multivariate adjustment for the child and family characteristics listed below. The
unit of observation was the child-year. Our primary goal was to compare the trend in
out-of-pocket spending before and during the recent recession. The National Bureau
of Economic Research reported that the recession officially started in December 2007
and ended in June 2009. We used spline modeling, with the regression identifying
a linear time trend from 2001 to 2007 and a separate linear time trend from 2007
to 2009 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). Complete details on the
methodology can be found in Appendix Exhibits ( A8- A11 ).
We controlled for the following child and family characteristics. Child charac-
teristics were age, sex, race, and ethnicity. Family characteristics were number of
adult family members, number of child siblings, highest family member educational
attainment, urban status as measured by residence in a Metropolitan Statistical Area,
Census region, and the presence of any limitations in activities of daily living or any
functional or sensory limitations in family members other than the child.
All analyses accounted for the MEPS complex survey design using the survey
commands in the statistical software Stata, version 12. The survey design variables
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also accounted for observations coming from multiple children in the same family
(Sribney, 1998; West, 2011).
4.2.5 Limitations
One limitation of our study was that out-of-pocket spending was broadly defined
rather than by specific services. Although it would also be valuable to stratify the
analyses by different types of services, our primary goal was to explore the effect of
the recession on overall out-of-pocket spending. In additional analyses presented in
the Appendix, we distinguished among broad service categories such as inpatient,
outpatient, emergency department, prescription drugs, and dental care.
Any reductions in spending might reflect the elimination of either needed or un-
needed services, and we were unable to directly distinguish between these two possi-
bilities. However, previous research suggests that adult patients themselves are poor
judges of the necessity of treatment for themselves (Goldman DP Zheng Y., 2007)
and their children (Leibowitz et al., 1985; Johnson et al., 2006; Karaca-Mandic P
Joyce GF,Goldman DP et al., 2012). That means it is reasonable to assume that
any general decline in spending resulting from the recession included at least some
necessary or recommended medical care.
Another data limitation was that use of health services in MEPS was self-reported
and subject to misreporting, as is the case with all self-reported data on health
care use (Bhandari and Wagner, 2006). Previous studies of MEPS have showed
that although inpatient stays were accurately reported, office visits and emergency
department visits were underreported by 19 percent and 30 percent, respectively.
However, underreporting occurred across all sociodemographic groups and should
not bias our analysis of changes in trends over time (Zuvekas and Olin, 2009b).
Studies have also documented differences between health care expenditures in
MEPS and those in the “gold standard” National Health Expenditure Accounts
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(Bernard et al., 2012; Zuvekas and Olin, 2009a; Aizcorbe et al., 2012). After adjusting
for the differences in underlying population, covered services, and other measurement
differences, MEPS total personal health care expenditures were 17.6 percent lower
than those in the National Health Expenditure Accounts in 2007. However, MEPS
out-of-pocket spending was only 5.5 percent lower than that in the National Health
Expenditure Accounts in the same year, and we are unaware of any evidence that
this difference has varied over time.
We also compared the out-of-pocket spending for adults versus children, defining
adults as anyone in the family over age eighteen-though the most relevant adults for
decision making are likely to be the child’s parents. Nonetheless, most of the adults in
the study families were in fact parents, and we treated these findings in our discussion
as primarily related to parental decision making. In a sensitivity analysis, we defined
adults in the family as only the child’s parents, thus excluding adult siblings and
grandparents living in the home. In another sensitivity test, we considered the health
insurance eligible units as an alternative to family units. Results were largely similar
in all three approaches.
Finally, we examined changes in out-of-pocket trends, after controlling for ob-
served child and family characteristics, in an attempt to quantify the impact of the
recession. We attributed the change in spending trends to the recession, but other
unmeasured factors may have driven these results. However, we are unaware of other
large-scale health policy or economic changes that would affect this population start-
ing in 2008.
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4.3 Study Results
4.3.1 Characteristics Of Children And Their Families
Table 4.1 and 4.2 presents the characteristics of the children and their families. Chil-
dren with special health care needs were older on average and had higher out-of-pocket
spending, compared to children without such needs.
Adults in families with special needs children also had higher out-of-pocket spend-
ing, compared to those in families without such children. This finding is consistent
with other studies that show that caregivers of children with special needs experience
higher emotional and physical stress, which is negatively associated with the care-
givers’ psychological and physical health (Altman et al., 1999; Brehaut et al., 2009,
2011, 2004; Murphy et al., 2007; Singer and Floyd, 2006).
4.3.2 Trends In Out-Of-Pocket Spending Before And During
The Recession
For children without special health care needs, out-of-pocket spending increased grad-
ually both before and during the recession, although the the trends were not statis-
tically different (Fig. 4.1). Average out-of-pocket spending for children with special
health care needs was substantially higher than for children without such needs (Fig.
4.2). Spending for children with special needs increased over time before the reces-
sion but decreased during the recession. The adjusted average out-of-pocket spending
was $774 in 2007, which declined to $626 in 2009. Appendix Exhibits A8 and A9
present the marginal effects of spending trends before and during the recession, as
well as other control variables on child out-of-pocket spending.
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Table 4.1: Non-CSHCN Weighted Descriptive Statistics
Estimate (SE)
Age (n=32,736) 8.6 (0.1)
Female (n=16,324) 50.2 (0.4)
Male (n=16,412) 49.8 (0.4)
Adults in family (n=32,736) 2.1 (0.0)
Siblings in family (n=32,736) 1.2 (0.0)
No other family have any limitation (n=24,924) 80.1 (0.4)
Some other family have any limitation (n=6,442) 19.9 (0.4)
No dental insurance (n=9,658) 28.9 (0.5)
Has dental insurance (n=23,078) 71.1 (0.5)
White (n=21,106) 71.0 (0.7)
Black (n=4,340) 9.3 (0.5)
AI/AN (n=432) 1.2 (0.1)
Asian (n=2,431) 6.1 (0.3)
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (n=3,472) 9.9 (0.4)
Multiple races (n=955) 2.5 (0.2)
Not Hispanic (n=25,717) 87.5 (0.5)
Hispanic (n=7,019) 12.5 (0.5)
Highest family edu less than college (n=9,995) 25.6 (0.6)
Highest family edu college (n=15,188) 51.8 (0.6)
Highest family edu 5+ years college (n=5,857) 22.5 (0.6)
Not Metropolitan Statistical Area (n=5,121) 15.5 (0.8)
Metropolitan Statistical Area (n=27,615) 84.5 (0.8)
NorthEast (n=5,103) 18.5 (0.7)
Midwest (n=7,657) 24.3 (0.9)
South (n=11,098) 33.1 (1.0)
West (n=8,878) 24.2 (0.9)
Average Annual Out-of-Pocket Spendings
Total for child $276.6 (5.6)
Total for adults $989.9 (16.0)
Total for adults per child $478.7 (7.9)
Source: MEPS 2001-2009
Notes:Children between ages 0-17 and their families, with private insurance,
non-missing policyholder’s OOP premium payment, policy holder lives with the
family
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Table 4.2: CSHCN Weighted Descriptive Statistics
Estimate (SE)
Age (n=7,342) 10.3 (0.1)
Female (n=3,107) 42.8 (0.8)
Male (n=4,235) 57.2 (0.8)
Adults in family (n=7,342) 2.1 (0.0)
Siblings in family (n=7,342) 1.1 (0.0)
No other family have any limitation (n=4,817) 68.6 (0.9)
Some other family have any limitation (n=2,324) 31.4 (0.9)
No dental insurance (n=2,172) 29.0 (0.9)
Has dental insurance (n=5,170) 71.0 (0.9)
White (n=4,913) 74.1 (0.8)
Black (n=955) 8.7 (0.5)
AI/AN (n=67) 0.9 (0.2)
Asian (n=325) 3.3 (0.3)
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (n=823) 10.4 (0.6)
Multiple races (n=259) 2.7 (0.3)
Not Hispanic (n=6,284) 91.2 (0.5)
Hispanic (n=1,058) 8.8 (0.5)
Highest family edu less than college (n=1,881) 22.1 (0.8)
Highest family edu college (n=3,603) 53.1 (1.0)
Highest family edu 5+ years college (n=1,450) 24.8 (1.0)
Not Metropolitan Statistical Area (n=1,142) 14.2 (0.9)
Metropolitan Statistical Area (n=6,200) 85.8 (0.9)
NorthEast (n=1,189) 18.8 (0.9)
Midwest (n=1,886) 25.5 (1.2)
South (n=2,672) 36.6 (1.3)
West (n=1,595) 19.1 (1.0)
Average Annual Out-of-Pocket Spendings
Total for child $685.8 (23.4)
Total for adults $1,319.1 (40.2)
Total for adults per child $630.9 (15.9)
Source: MEPS 2001-2009
Notes:Children between ages 0-17 and their families, with private insurance,
non-missing policyholder’s OOP premium payment, policy holder lives with the
family
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Figure 4.1: Out-of-pocket spending ($) for children without special health care needs
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Figure 4.2: Out-of-pocket spending ($) for children with special health care needs
Average annual out-of-pocket spending for adults in the study families increased
significantly per adult before the recession, both in families of children without special
health care needs (Fig. 4.3) and in families of children with such needs (Fig. 4.4). And
in both types of families spending per adult decreased sharply during the recession.
Appendix Exhibits A10 and A11 present the marginal effects of spending trends
and other control variables on adult out-of-pocket spending.
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Figure 4.3: Out-of-pocket spending for adults in families ($ per adult) with children
without special health care needs
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Figure 4.4: Out-of-pocket spending for adults in families ($ per adult) with children
with special health care needs
Several sensitivity tests were conducted of our benchmark models. First, we lim-
ited the study sample to children who were continuously enrolled in private insurance
throughout a given year. Our results were largely unchanged, although among chil-
dren with special health care needs, the change in out-of-pocket trend associated with
the recession was smaller than it was in our benchmark sample, partly as a result of
the reduced sample size. This also may suggest that children who are covered continu-
ously with private insurance are better protected from the adverse effects of recession
than children whose families lost coverage for part of a year.
A second sensitivity analysis focused only on parents, instead of on all adults in
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the family. A third analysis considered health insurance eligibility units instead of
family units. Our benchmark findings were robust to both of these refinements.
Fourth, we explored the impact of the recession after incrementally including sev-
eral of its features, such as the employment status of the adults in the family and
federal poverty level thresholds. We found that the change in out-of-pocket trends
associated with the recession were slightly reduced with the inclusion of unemploy-
ment and federal poverty level categories as control variables, but the trends were
still similar to those in our benchmark estimates.
However, the employment status of the adults and federal poverty level categories
are limited in fully capturing the impact of the recession through unemployment and
income. For example, even among the employed, work hours and salary growth were
reduced. In addition, the recession probably had adverse effects on savings, housing
value, and liquidity. These factors were more immediate, affected households early in
2008, and were not well captured in the available data.
Lastly, we investigated the impact of the recession on total expenditures, fam-
ily spending on insurance premiums, and out-of-pocket spending and use by broad
service categories (inpatient, outpatient, emergency department, and dental care and
prescription drugs). During the recession, total expenditure growth increased only for
children without special health care needs. Premium spending was reduced. Reduc-
tions in out-of-pocket spending growth during the recession for children with special
health care needs and adults were primarily driven by reductions in the use of pre-
scription drugs and, to some extent, by reductions in the use of dental care, although
trend differences for dental care were significant only for the adults.
Analyses of use outcomes confirm this pattern. Given the small sample size,
decomposing health care services into these categories may have limited our power to
detect effects in the other use categories.
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4.4 Discussion
In our study of families with private health insurance, we found that the recession
of 2007-09 was not associated with a decline in out-of-pocket spending for most chil-
dren. However, adults in those families experienced significant declines in out-of-
pocket spending during the recession, suggesting that families may have been forced
to reduce parents’ spending on health services for themselves to maintain their prior
level of spending on services for their children. Although children in general were not
significantly affected by the recession, we did find a significant reversal in the spend-
ing trend for children with special health care needs. After years of steady increases
in out-of-pocket spending for this group, spending declined in 2007-09.
Overall, out-of-pocket spending was determined by two primary factors: service
use and insurance benefit design. We were not able to control for benefit design
because the MEPS household survey does not contain such information. Evidence
suggests that in many cases deductibles and cost-sharing requirements in the private
insurance market have been increasing as a proportion of total spending (Cunning-
ham, 2010; Cohen and Martinez, 2012). We found that out-of-pocket spending slowed
down during the recession, despite the fact that cost-sharing requirements in many
plans were increasing.
Our results suggest that the recession reduced out-of-pocket spending for adults
and for children with special health care needs through a reduction in use that was
large enough to offset any increased cost-sharing requirements during this period. The
reductions in use are concerning, given that previous research has shown an associ-
ation between forgone care and adverse outcomes, especially for children with spe-
cial health care needs (Lavarreda et al., 2011; Karaca-Mandic P Joyce GF,Goldman
DP et al., 2012; Newacheck et al., 2000). Our findings suggest that dental services
and prescription drugs may be particularly vulnerable areas of care during economic
downturns.
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4.4.1 Policy Implications
Our findings have implications for policy makers in two primary areas. First, the
Affordable Care Act may have a major impact on out-of-pocket spending for families
with children. The broad Medicaid expansion scheduled for 2014 (for people with
incomes of up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level) and cost-sharing subsidies
(for those with incomes of up to 250 percent of the level) and tax credits to reduce
premiums for insurance through insurance exchanges (for people with incomes of 100-
400 percent of the federal poverty level) are likely to reduce the out-of-pocket burden
on privately insured families, especially those with lower incomes.
Of the families in our study sample, 28 percent had incomes of less than 100
percent of the federal poverty level. Eight percent had incomes of 100-125 percent of
poverty, 20 percent had incomes of 125-200 percent of poverty, and 27 percent had
incomes of 200-400 percent of poverty.
Furthermore, the law’s elimination of cost sharing for many preventive services
applies to all income groups. This provision may be particularly beneficial for children
because a higher share of their care is likely to fall under this heading than is the case
with adults. Other Affordable Care Act provisions that prohibit health plans from
setting lifetime limits on coverage and from excluding care or coverage for preexisting
conditions are expected to substantially benefit people of all ages with special health
care needs.
Our findings also suggest the importance of considering the impact of policies
affecting health coverage in the context of the entire family rather than individuals.
Reducing the cost-sharing burden for children’s coverage may help parents avoid the
difficult decision of whether to cut back on their own care to pay for their children’s.
A second area of policy affected by our findings relates to the future of the Chil-
dren’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). CHIP generally offers coverage to children
in low- and middle-income families with more limited cost sharing than private insur-
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ance. As of January 2012 twenty-two states required copayments for nonpreventive
physician visits for CHIP services covering children whose family income was at least
201 percent of the federal poverty level. These copayments were $5 or less in eleven
states, $10 in eight states, and $15-$20 in the remaining three states (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2012).
In contrast, private insurance policies in the group market required, on average,
copayments of $23.34 for an office visit in 2011 (Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality, 2011a). Moreover, in private insurance plans the average individual
deductible was $1,123 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2012) and the
average family deductible was $2,220 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
2012).
However, CHIP is currently funded only through 2015, and its fate after that is
highly uncertain. Our findings suggest that private insurance leaves families with
children vulnerable during times of economic downturn and may force parents and
children with special health care needs to cut back on needed services. The defunding
or elimination of CHIP could exacerbate such problems in the future (Kenney et al.,
2011).
4.5 Conclusion
We found evidence that the recession of 2007-09 did not affect out-of-pocket health
care spending for most children, but it did lead to a sharp reduction in spending for
children with special health care needs. Furthermore, adults in families with children
also experienced reductions in out-of-pocket spending during the recession, indicating
that though health care spending for children in general was not adversely affected
during the economic downturn, this may have been at the expense of their parents’
health care. Policy efforts to bolster coverage for families with children are needed
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to protect the health care use of both children and parents during times of economic
hardship.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The three papers in this dissertation investigated topics in health economics to ad-
dress some of the challenges in the US health care system. The first paper investigated
the great recession and hospital capital investment and found evidence of liquidity
constraint among not for profit and public hospitals during the recession. Hospital
ownership determines what type of financing mechanism is available for capital in-
vestment. Not for profit and public hospitals must use cash flow or debt whereas
investor owned hospitals also have access to equity. Thus investor owned hospitals
are less susceptible to liquidity constraint.
The theoretical cause of liquidity constraint is asymmetric information between the
lenders and hospitals, a market failure that warrants policy intervention. Strength-
ening the financial disclosure requirements in the municipal bond market, where not
for profit and public hospitals borrow, may mitigate the information problem be-
tween hospitals and lenders and alleviate hospital liquidity constraint in an economic
recession.
The theoretical modeling of hospital capital investment and the estimation method
for identifying the cash flow effect is a strength of the paper. However, the theoretical
model of hospital grossly simplifies the hospital capital investment decision and the
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study was limited to only California hospitals rather than a national sample of hos-
pitals. Policy changes that overlap with the recession may also have affected hospital
capital investment.
The second paper investigated the cost effectiveness of telecare management for
pain and depression in patients with cancer. Centralized telecare management com-
bined with automated symptom monitoring for cancer patients with pain and depres-
sion was found to be a cost effective intervention for pain and depression in patients
with cancer.
The intervention was associated improved quality adjusted life years during the
12 month trial. The intervention group was associated with a yearly increase of
60.3 depression-free days and an increase of between 0.033 and 0.066 quality-adjusted
life years compared to the usual care group. The resulting incremental cost per
quality-adjusted life year ranged from $18,018 to $ 36,035. The study was limited
to community-based rural and urban oncology practices in Indiana, many without
electronic medical records, thus cost analysis was limited to intervention costs rather
than total health care costs.
The third paper investigated how out of pocket health care spending for children
changed during the recession. Out-of-pocket health care spending for most children
did not show a change in trend before and during the recession. However, out-of-
pocket health care spending sharply declined during the recession among children with
special health care needs. Out-of-pocket health care spending of adults in families
with children also declined during the recession.
The strength of the paper is using medical expenditure panel survey to make
nationally representative estimates on out-of-pocket health care spending. But the
medical expenditure panel survey does not provide data on insurance benefit design,
which is a determinant of out-of-pocket spending. Another data limitation is that
the medical expenditure panel survey is self-reported therefore subject to data mis-
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reporting. Previous studies using the medical expenditure panel survey found that
underreporting did not vary by sociodemographic characteristics.
The study highlights the vulnerability of children with special health care needs
during an economic recession. Also out-of-pocket health care spending of adults in
families with children also declined during the recession, suggesting that parents may
have been substituting their own health care spending with their children’s spending.
Health care reform efforts to reduce out-of-pocket spending for children may also save
parents from reducing their own health care spending.
My future research aims to extend my understanding of how hospitals respond to
financial shocks like the recession to investigate the impact of health care reform on
hospital financial performance. The Affordable Care Act includes provisions that re-
form payments to hospitals, which may have strong implications for hospital financial
performance. I want to inform policy discussions around improving patient access to
hospital services and containing hospital costs.
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Appendix
1.1 The Great Recession and Hospital Capital In-
vestment
1.1.1 Euler Equation
Value function V that maximizes the manager’s utility function at time t and the
present value of all expected future utilities discounted by discount factor β. U is
the hospital Manager’s utility function to be maximized. It is specified as net profits
where cash inflows include operating profits pi and borrowing B; cash outflows include
adjustment cost CK , capital investments IK , and interest expense on debt rD.
Capital K (state variable, stock) represents the total stock of capital. Capital
evolves over time through the capital accumulation equation (1.3). Capital stock
in the next time period Kt+1 is equal to capital stock Kt , minus depreciation δKt
(depreciation rate δ) , plus capital investment IKt at current period. Capital K is
restricted to be non-negative because it is a required input for hospital operations
(1.8).
Liquidity constraint limits net debt D to be less than or equal to D∗ (1.9). D∗ rep-
resents an upper bound on net debt set by creditors. Bankruptcy constraint specifies
the manager’s utility function to be non-negative (1.10) such that the cash outflows
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can not exceed cash inflows. Negative cash flow indicates that a hospital is bankrupt
where cash inflow is not sufficient to pay for cash outflows.
V (Kt, Dt) = max
IKt ,Bt
Ut + Et
∞∑
s=1
βsUt+s (1.1)
Subject to:
Ut = pit(Kt, Lt, ζt)− CK(Kt, IKt )− IKt (1.2)
− rtDt +Bt
Kt+1 = g(Kt, I
K
t ) = Kt(1− δ) + IKt (1.3)
Dt+1 = n(Dt, Bt) = Dt +Bt (1.4)
pit(Kt, Lt, ζt) = p
Q
t F (Kt, Lt)− pLLt + ζt (1.5)
CK(Kt, I
K
t ) =
α
2
(
IKt
Kt
)2
Kt ≥ 0 (1.6)
rt > 0 (1.7)
Kt ≥ 0 (1.8)
Dt ≤ D∗t (1.9)
Ut ≥ 0 (1.10)
We can rewrite the value function (1.1) as a more general Bellman equation V
where it is a function of the state variables Kt , At, Dt, and with an infinite horizon.
Note that the present time utility function Ut is not subject to the expectations
operator. This is because at time t, we know the values of today’s shock ζt.
V (Kt, Dt) = max
IKt ,Bt
Ut + Et[βV (Kt+1, Dt+1)] (1.11)
Lagrangian for the maximization problem above is written as below with λt as the
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Lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity constraint (1.10) and γt as the Lagrange
multiplier on the debt constraint (1.9).
L = Ut + Et[βV (Kt+1, Dt+1)] + λtUt + γt(D∗t −Dt) (1.12)
First order conditions are derived by taking partial derivatives of the Lagrangian
with respect to the control variables IKt , Bt and the Lagrange multipliers λt and γt.
Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
∂L
∂IKt
= (1 + λt)
∂Ut
∂IKt
+ Et
[
β
∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1)
∂g
∂IKt
(Kt, I
K
t )
]
≤ 0 (1.13)
IKt ≥ 0 (1.14)
IKt
∂L
∂IKt
= 0 (1.15)
∂L
∂Bt
= (1 + λt)
∂Ut
∂Bt
+ Et
[
β
∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1)
∂n
∂Bt
(Dt, Bt)
]
≤ 0 (1.16)
Bt ≥ 0 (1.17)
Bt
∂L
∂Bt
= 0 (1.18)
0 ≤ Ut (1.19)
λt ≥ 0 (1.20)
λtUt = 0 (1.21)
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0 ≤ D∗t −Dt (1.22)
γt ≥ 0 (1.23)
γt(D
∗
t −Dt) = 0 (1.24)
FOC (1.13) yields (1.25) which then simplifies to (1.26).
(1 + λt)
(
−∂C
K
t
∂IKt
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂Ut
∂IKt
+ Et
β ∂V∂Kt+1 (Kt+1, Dt+1) ∂g∂IKt (Kt, IKt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
 = 0 (1.25)
(1 + λt)
(
1 +
∂CKt
∂IKt
)
= Et
[
β
∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1)
]
(1.26)
FOC (1.16) yields (1.27) which then simplifies to (1.28).
(1 + λt) (1)︸︷︷︸
∂Ut
∂Bt
+ Et
β ∂V∂Dt+1 (Kt+1, Dt+1) ∂n∂Bt (Dt, Bt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
 = 0 (1.27)
− (1 + λt) = Et
[
β
∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1)
]
(1.28)
Expression for ∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1) in (1.26) can be derived as follows. First solve
for ∂V
∂Kt
(Kt, Dt).
∂V
∂Kt
(Kt, Dt) = (1 + λt)
∂Ut
∂Kt
+ Et
[
β
∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1)
∂g
∂Kt
(Kt, I
K
t )
]
= (1 + λt)
∂Ut
∂Kt
+ Et[ β
∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
substitue in the left handside of (1.26)
(1− δ)]
= (1 + λt)
∂Ut
∂Kt
+
[
(1 + λt)
(
1 +
∂CKt
∂IKt
)
(1− δ)
]
(1.29)
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Then we can take the expression for ∂V
∂Kt
(Kt, Dt) in (1.29) one time period forward
to yield ∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1).
∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1) = (1 + λt+1)
∂Ut+1
∂Kt+1
+
[
(1 + λt+1)
(
1 +
∂CKt+1
∂IKt+1
)
(1− δ)
]
= (1 + λt+1)
(
∂Ut+1
∂Kt+1
+
(
1 +
∂CKt+1
∂IKt+1
)
(1− δ)
)
(1.30)
Inserting the expression for ∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1) from (1.30) to the FOC (1.26) yields
the Euler equation (1.31) which can be rearranged as (1.32):
(1 + λt)
(
1 +
∂CKt
∂IKt
)
= Et
[
β (1 + λt+1)
(
∂Ut+1
∂Kt+1
+
(
1 +
∂CKt+1
∂IKt+1
)
(1− δ)
)]
(1.31)
1 +
∂CKt
∂IKt
= Et
[
β
(
1 + λt+1
1 + λt
)(
∂Ut+1
∂Kt+1
+
(
1 +
∂CKt+1
∂IKt+1
)
(1− δ)
)]
(1.32)
Deriving the expression for ∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1) in (1.28) is analogous to deriving
∂V
∂Kt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1) shown in equations (1.29) through (1.32). Expression for
∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1) in (1.28) can be derived as follows. First solve for ∂V∂Dt (Kt, Dt).
∂V
∂Dt
(Kt, Dt) = (1 + λt)
∂Ut
∂Dt
+ Et
[
β
∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1)
∂n
∂Dt
(Dt, Bt)
]
− γt
= (1 + λt)
∂Ut
∂Dt
+ Et
[
β
∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
substitue in the left handside of (1.28)
(1)
]
− γt
= (1 + λt)
∂Ut
∂Dt
+ [− (1 + λt) (1)]− γt
= − (1 + λt) (rt) + [− (1 + λt) (1)]− γt (1.33)
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Then we can take the expression for ∂V
∂Dt
(Kt, Dt) in (1.33) one time period forward
to yield ∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1).
∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1) = − (1 + λt+1) (rt+1) + [− (1 + λt+1) (1)]− γt+1 (1.34)
Inserting the expression for ∂V
∂Dt+1
(Kt+1, Dt+1) from (1.34) to the FOC (1.28) yields
the Euler equation (1.35).
1 = Et
[
β
(
1 + λt+1
1 + λt
)
(rit+1 + 1) +
γt+1
1 + λt
]
(1.35)
The Euler equations that must be satisfied to maximize the value function are:
1 +
∂CKt
∂IKt
= Et
[
β
(
1 + λt+1
1 + λt
)(
∂Ut+1
∂Kt+1
+
(
1 +
∂CKt+1
∂IKt+1
)
(1− δ)
)]
(1.36)
1 = Et
[
β
(
1 + λt+1
1 + λt
)
(rt+1 + 1) +
γt+1
1 + λt
]
(1.37)
Empirical model derived from equation (1.36) is specified as follows. First substi-
tute the LHS with functional form for ∂C
K
t
∂IKt
, with CK(Kt, IKt ) specified below.
CK(Kt, I
K
t ) =
α
2
(
IKt
Kt
)2
Kt (1.38)
∂CKt
∂IKt
= α
IKt
Kt
(1.39)
Second, linearize the RHS using first order taylor approximation. To simplify the
notation, let Θt =
(
1+λt+1
1+λ
)
and let Ω =
[(
1+λt+1
1+λt
)(
∂Ut+1
∂Kt+1
+
(
1 +
∂CKt+1
∂IKt+1
)
(1 − δ)
]
.
Then linearize the the RHS using first order taylor approximation around the means
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of Θt and Ω. Expected value of Θt should be around 1 assuming hospital’s magnitude
of liquidity constraint do not vary significantly year to year, thus E(Θt) w 1. Then
let ω represent the expected value of Ω, thus E(Ω) = ω
Let f(Θ,Ω) = ΘΩ be an infinitely differentiable function around (Θ, Ω) = (1, γ).
f(Θ,Ω) ≈ f(1, ω) + f1(1, γ)(Θ− 1) + f2(1, ω)(Ω− ω)
≈ ω + ω(Θ− 1) + 1(Ω− ω)
≈ constant+ ωΘ + Ω (1.40)
Substitute (1.39) and (1.40) into (1.36).
IKt
Kt
= Et
[
β
α
(constant+ ωΘ + Ω)
]
= Et
[
β
α
(
constant+ ω
(
1 + λt+1
1 + λt
)
+
(
∂Ut+1
∂Kt+1
+
(
∂CKt+1
∂IKt+1
)
(1− δ)
)]
(1.41)
Substitute
(
∂Ut+1
∂Kt+1
+
(
α
IKt+1
Kt+1
)
(1− δ)
)
in (1.41) with marginal product of capital
(MPK) (Gilchrist & Himmelberg 1998). MPK is proxied by
MPK =
OperatingRevenue
TotalCapital
(1.42)
which is equivalent to how it is typically specified as sales over capital in the literature.
Empirical model for (1.36) is
IKt
Kt
= Et
[
β
α
(
constant+ ω
(
1 + λt+1
1 + λt
)
+MPKit+1
)]
(1.43)
Similarly, empirical model derived from equation (1.37) is specified as the fol-
lowing. Linearize the RHS using first order taylor approximation and replace the
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expectation with the observed plus error.
1 = Et
[
β
(
constant+ ω
(
1 + λt+1
1 + λt
)
+ (rt+1 + 1) +
γt+1
1 + λt
)]
(1.44)
Rearrange (1.44) such that ω
(
1+λt+1
1+λt
)
is on the LHS.
Et
[
ω
(
1 + λt+1
1 + λt
)]
= Et
[
1
β
−
(
constant+ rt+1 + 1 +
γt+1
1 + λt
)]
(1.45)
Substitute (1.45) into (1.43) yields the empirical model for capital investment.
IKit
Kit
= Et
[
β
α
(
constant+
1
β
−
(
rt+1 + 1 +
γit+1
1 + λit
)
+MPKit+1
)]
(1.46)
1.1.2 Marginal Product of Capital (MPK)
Marginal product of capital is unobserved but average product of capital is observed.
For any differentiable production function there is a relationship between average
product of capital (APK) to the marginal product of capital, αK = MPK/APK,
where αK is the output elasticity of capital in the production function (cite Henderson
Quandt). Derivation below shows the substitution for MPK using APK in a Cobb-
Douglas production function. APK is measured as Operating RevenueValue of Capital .
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Y = F (K,L) (1.47)
F (K,L) = AKα
K
Lβ (1.48)
max
K,L
pi = pF (K,L)− rK − wL (1.49)
∂pi
∂K
= pαKAKα
K−1LB − r = 0 (1.50)
⇐⇒ αKAKαK−1LB = r
p
⇐⇒ αK Y
K
=
r
p
⇐⇒ MPK = r
p
∂pi
∂L
= pβAKαLβ−1 − r = 0 (1.51)
⇐⇒ βY
L
=
w
p
Operating Revenue
Value of Capital
=
pYHospital Output
pKCapital
=
pY Y
pKK
(1.52)
MPK = αK
Y
K
= αK
Sales
K
(1.53)
pYMPK = αK
pYHospital Output
Capital
(1.54)
pY
pK
MPK = αK
pYHospital Output
pKCapital
(1.55)
pY
pK
MPK = αK
Operating Revenue
Value of Capital
(1.56)
Prices are normalized to unity, MPK = αK
Operating Revenue
Value of Capital
(1.57)
1.1.3 System Generalized Method of Moments
Model consists of a system of level and differenced equation (eqn. 1.58). Consider
a data generating process with the dependent variable yt (index i is suppressed for
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simplification) and endogenous regressor xt
Levels equation:
Differenced equation:
 yt
∆yt
 = β
 x′t
∆x′t
+
 εt
∆εt
 (1.58)
Suppose εt is autoregressive of order p (eqn. 1.59).
εt is AR(p) εt =
p∑
k=1
ρkεt−k + ωt (1.59)
In the levels equation, ∆xt−a, ∀a > p is used to instrument for the endogenous
regressors xit (eqn. 1.60). In the differenced equation, xt−(a+1),∀a > p is used to
instrument for the endogenous regressors ∆xit (eqn. 1.60) (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
E(∆xt−aεt) = 0,
E(xt−(a+1)∆εt) = 0,
∀a > p (1.60)
Suppose that endogenous xt is persistent and its data generating process is AR(1).
xt is correlated with the error term εt (eqn. 1.61).
xit = αxt−1 + εt (1.61)
Exogeneity of Instruments
Suppose εt is AR(0). Then in the levels equation, 1 or more period lagged change of
∆xt−a, a > 0 is exogenous to the error term (eqn. 1.62, 1.63).
yt = βxt + εt (1.62)
∆xt−1 = (αxt−2 + εt−1)− (αxt−3 + εt−2)
= (αxt−2 − αxt−3) + (εt−1 − εt−2) (1.63)
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In the differenced equation 2 or more period lagged level of xt−(a+1), a > 0 is
exogenous to the differenced error term (eqn. 1.64, 1.65).
yt − yt−1 = β(xt − xt−1) + (εt − εt−1) (1.64)
xt−2 = αxt−3 + εt−2 (1.65)
Suppose εt is AR(1). Then in the levels equation, 2 or more period lagged change
of ∆xt−a, a > 1 is exogenous to the error term (eqn. 1.66, 1.67).
yt = βxt + εt
= βxt + ρεt−1 + εt (1.66)
∆xt−2 = (αxt−3 + εt−2)− (αxt−4 + εt−3)
= (αxt−3 − αxt−4) + (εt−2 − εt−3) (1.67)
In the differenced equation, 3 or more period lagged level of xt−(a+1) a > 1 is
exogenous to the differenced error term (eqn. 1.68, 1.69).
yt − yt−1 = β(xt − xt−1) + (εt − εt−1)
= β(xt − xt−1) + ρ(εt−1 − εt−2) + (εt − εt−1) (1.68)
xt−3 = αxt−4 + εt−3 (1.69)
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Strength of Instruments
In the levels equation, lagged change ∆xt−1 is used to instrument for xt. ∆xt−1 is
related to xt by (α−1−α−2), the change in the effect of current x on past x (eqn. 1.70).
∆xt−1 = xt−1 − xt−2
= (α−1xt − α−1εt)− (α−2xt − α−2εt − α−1εt−1)
= (α−1 − α−2)xt − (α−1 − α−2)εt + α−1εt−1 (1.70)
In the differenced equation, xt−2 is used to instrument for ∆xt. xt−2 is related to
∆xt by 1α2−α . First, ∆xt can be expressed in terms of xt−2 (eqn. 1.71).
∆xt = xt − xt−1
= (αxt−1 + εt)− (αxt−2 + εt−1)
= (α2xt−2 + αεt−1 + εt)− (αxt−2 + εt−1)
= (α2 − α)xt−2 + (α − 1)εt−1 + εt (1.71)
Then rearrange to put xt−2 on the left hand side (eqn. 1.72).
xt−2 =
1
α2 − α (∆xt − (α− 1)εt−1 − εt)
=
1
α2 − α∆xt −
1
α
εt−1 − 1
α2 − αεt (1.72)
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1.1.4 Alternative Specification: GMM estimates with Cash
Flow and Liquid Assets Interaction Term
Table A1: Pre-Recession 2002-2006 Estimates with Interaction Term
All FE GMM
I/Kit (1) (2)
CF/Kit -.0351 .0231
( .0186) ( .0563)
LA/Kit -.0084 .227
( .0621) ( .1793)
CF/Kit ∗ LA/Kit .1675 -.383
( .1116) ( .4823)
APKit+1 .1129 ** .038 ***
( .0343) ( .007)
rit+1 -.002 ** -.0194
( 6.3e-04) ( .0134)
2003 -.0113 -.0201
( .0063) ( .0128)
2004 -.0081 -.016
( .0097) ( .0158)
2005 .0123 -6.6e-04
( .0139) ( .0134)
2006 -8.3e-04 -.0122
( .0092) ( .0192)
constant -.0654 .1465
( .0549) ( .0783)
AB test for AR(2) p-val .424
Hansen p-val .297
N instruments 46
N obs 1333 1091
N hospitals 263 250
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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Table A2: During-Recession 2008-2010 Estimates with Interaction Term
All FE GMM
I/Kit (1) (2)
CF/Kit .0979 *** .0847 **
( .0189) ( .0324)
LA/Kit -.0263 .0873
( .0866) ( .0919)
CF/Kit ∗ LA/Kit -.0351 -.2505
( .1107) ( .2242)
APKit+1 .0525 ** .0256 *
( .0196) ( .0125)
rit+1 -3.2e-04 -.0156
( 4.7e-04) ( .0237)
2009 .0176 * -.0108
( .007) ( .0073)
2010 .0033 .0212
( .0076) ( .0346)
constant .0148 .1494
( .0325) ( .1268)
AB test for AR(2) p-val .226
Hansen p-val .476
N instruments 86
N obs 669 664
N hospitals 247 236
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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Table A3: Recovery 2011-2012 Estimates with Interaction Term
All FE GMM
I/Kit (1) (2)
CF/Kit .1209 -.0505
( .1669) ( .1032)
LA/Kit -.0286 -.0866
( .049) ( .067)
CF/Kit ∗ LA/Kit -.0856 .2443
( .1321) ( .1594)
APKit+1 .0219 .0361 **
( .0479) ( .0123)
rit+1 -.009 ** .0453
( .0033) ( .0289)
2012 .0345 .0339 *
( .0383) ( .0141)
constant .1142 -.1906
( .1007) ( .1483)
AB test for AR(2) p-val .
Hansen p-val .372
N instruments 62
N obs 890 445
N hospitals 253 237
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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1.2 Cost Effectiveness of Telecare Management for
Pain and Depression in Patients with Cancer:
Results from a Randomized Trial
1.2.1 Effectiveness Metrics
Converting DFD to QALY (Schoenbaum, 2001)
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1.2.2 Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (ICER)
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1.2.3 Detailed INCPAD Cost Determination
Table A4: Aggregate projected post-startup costs - 202 theoretical new intervention
patients
Table A5: Aggregate projected post-startup costs - 154 theoretical new intervention
patients
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Table A6: Aggregate projected post-startup costs - 202 theoretical new intervention
patients*
Table A7: Aggregate projected post-startup costs - 154 theoretical new intervention
patients*
* Projected post-startup costs would be the costs for all new patients receiving the
intervention after the study. Physician and nurse time is estimated to be the same
for the same number of patients buy automated monitoring costs are only
maintenance since system is already setup.
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1.3 Recession Led To A Decline In Out-Of-Pocket
Spending For ChildrenWith Special Health Care
Needs
Table A8: Out-of-pocket spending for children without special health care needs,
estimates of marginal effects
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Table A9: Out-of-pocket spending for children with special health care needs, esti-
mates of marginal effects
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Table A10: Out-of-pocket spending for adults, ( $ per adult), in families with children
without special health care needs, estimates of marginal effects
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Table A11: Out-of-pocket spending for adults, ( $ per adult), in families with children
with special health care needs, estimates of marginal effects
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